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COMMENTS
FAIR NOTICE: REASSESSING NLRB
AUTHORITY TO INFORM EMPLOYEES OF
THEIR RIGHTS TO UNIONIZE
DANIEL B. AMODEO
Today, the vast majority of American workers are unaware of their
substantive rights to organize and engage in concerted activities in the
workplace. Over the last thirty years, union activism has experienced stark
declines that have consequently lessened the level of public educational
dialogue surrounding labor rights. As the agency tasked with promoting and
enforcing labor organization rights, the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) sought to combat this issue through its rarely utilized rulemaking
authority—a measure fraught with perilous consequences. In 2011, the
NLRB promulgated a regulation that required employers to display posters in
the workplace that inform employees of their substantive rights. This effort
faced major criticism, setting off litigation that invalidated the notice poster
requirement and ultimately curtailed the NLRB’s authority to codify
substantive rules. Without reexamination, the results of the notice poster
litigation will substantially impact the NLRB’s future rulemaking efforts.
Despite the Supreme Court’s affirmation of the NLRB’s power to issue
substantive rules in American Hospital Ass’n v. NLRB, two courts
invalidated the NLRB’s notice-posting regulation as an overreach of the
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Board’s rulemaking authority. Remarkably, both decisions arrived at the
same conclusion through starkly different reasoning. Categorizing the
NLRB as a purely reactive entity, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit invalidated the notice-posting rule as an impermissible proactive
effort in Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB. Alternatively, in National
Ass’n of Manufacturers v. NLRB, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit held that the notice-posting regulation violated
statutory and constitutional protections of workplace speech regarding
labor organization.
This Comment argues that the Fourth and D.C. Circuit opinions create a
difficult barrier for all future NLRB rulemakings, and their combined result
contradicts the Supreme Court’s decision in American Hospital Ass’n.
Looking to constructions of the NLRB’s rulemaking authority, as well as the
legislative history of rulemaking and notice under the National Labor
Relations Act, this Comment proposes that the NLRB possesses rulemaking
authority to proactively restrict and influence matters through generally
applicable regulations. In particular, the progeny of union-specific notice
requirements pursuant to Communications Workers of America v. Beck
provide a strong basis for NLRB authority to require more generalized
notification of rights. Moreover, in examining the contents of the notice
poster, this Comment argues that the regulation does not violate workplace
speech protections because the poster bears a purely governmental message that
is reasonable in the discourse and debate of labor rights. Furthermore,
employers who disagree with the poster maintain the right to disavow any
nexus or endorsement with the posters content.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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1. Beck and AHA as a framework for a notice-posting
requirement under the NLRA .................................... 821
2. Finding the gap: The statutory absence of noticeposting requirements under the NLRA ..................... 824
a. NLRA provisions support the Board’s authority
to promulgate a notice requirement ................... 825
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An
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The labor movement was the principal force that transformed misery and
despair into hope and progress. Out of its bold struggles, economic and
social reform gave birth to unemployment insurance, old age pensions,
government relief for the destitute, and above all new wage levels that meant
not mere survival but a tolerable life. The Captains of Industry did not
lead this transformation; they resisted it until they were overcome. When in
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the thirties the wave of union organization crested over the nation, it carried
to secure shores not only itself but the whole society.

—Martin Luther King, Jr.1
INTRODUCTION
There is much truth to the old adage “knowledge is power.” Born
from this maxim is the controversy between labor and business
regarding a simple poster intended to teach employees about their
right to unionize.2 In 2011, the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB or “the Board”) promulgated a regulation requiring that all
employers subject to the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA or “the Act”) post notices in the workplace that inform
employees of their substantive rights.3 The notice poster, an elevenby-seventeen inch document,4 provides a restatement of various
unfair labor practices and available remedies under the NLRA.5 The
policy aim of the posting rule is simple: increase awareness of the law
“to better enable the exercise of rights under the statute, and to
promote statutory compliance by employers and unions.”6
Despite the NLRB’s noble justifications, critics assert that the
Board lacks authority to promulgate a compulsory notice-posting
regulation because of its purely reactive role as an arbiter of labor
disputes.7
Moreover, critics have also questioned the legal
implications of a notice-posting requirement, specifically with respect

1. Martin Luther King, Jr., Address to the State Convention of the Illinois, AFLCIO 1–2 (Oct. 7, 1965) (transcript available at http://mlk-kpp01.stanford.edu//primary
documents/651007-002.pdf).
2. See generally Teresa Tritch, Editorial, No Right To Know Your Rights, N.Y. TIMES
(May 9, 2013), http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/09/no-right-to-know-your
-rights (discussing the problematic nature of the poster because many employees do
not know about their right to unionize, but employers are not required to post the
poster, which informs employees about their right to unionize).
3. See Proposed Rules Governing Notification of Employee Rights Under the
National Labor Relations Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 80,410 (proposed Dec. 22, 2010) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 104).
4. See 29 C.F.R. § 104.202 (b) (2012) (“The Notice to employees shall be at least 11
inches by 17 inches in size, and in such format, type size, and style as the Board shall
prescribe.”); see also Employee Rights Notice Posting, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD,
http://www.nlrb.gov/poster (last visited Jan. 16, 2014) (providing various copies of
printable NLRB notice posters for employer use and display in compliance with the rule).
5. See Employee Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act, NAT’L LAB. REL.
BOARD, http://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/basic-page/node-3788
/employee_rights_fnl.pdf (last visited Jan. 16, 2014).
6. 75 Fed. Reg. at 80,410.
7. See infra notes 22–27 and accompanying text (explaining how Congress
delegated adjudicatory authority to the Board contingent upon an aggrieved party
bringing an unfair labor practice (“ULP”) claim).
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to statutory protections that govern speech rights in the workplace.8
As a matter of jurisdiction, the NLRB may not investigate or
engage any labor dispute without first receiving a timely filing
from one of the affected parties.9 In response, supporters argue
that the NLRB is unable to effectively operate if the public at large
remains uneducated about its rights to bring labor controversies
before the Board.10
The tension between opponents and supporters of the noticeposting requirement has culminated in a heated political debate
seeking to define the powers of the NLRB as an agency.11 Lawsuits
challenging the regulation grappled with the wisdom and legality of
the Board’s requirement that employers display governmentsponsored posters aimed at educating workers.12 Ultimately, courts
deemed the notice-posting requirement invalid, posing significant
challenges to the Board’s rulemaking authority and weakening efforts
to educate the public of its substantive labor rights.13
This Comment argues that the NLRB possesses the rulemaking
authority necessary to promulgate a notice-posting requirement, and
that the compulsory poster does not violate speech protections
because it advances a strictly factual and governmental message that
employers are free to openly disagree with. Part I of this Comment
provides an overview of the Board’s path to promulgating a noticeposting requirement, as well as the political and legal landscape that
has affected the process. Part II analyzes the NLRB’s authority to
promulgate the notice-posting rule by examining the mechanisms of
the Board’s rulemaking authority in tandem with the legislative
history of notice-posting requirements under the NLRA. In doing so,
Part II prescribes a framework of Supreme Court case law to support
8. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 717 F.3d 947, 956–59 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
(recounting arguments made by the opponents to the NLRB’s proposed regulation
with respect to section 8(c) of the Act).
9. See infra notes 22–27 and accompanying text.
10. See Peter D. DeChiara, The Right To Know: An Argument for Informing Employees
of Their Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 431, 435–36,
436 n.28 (1995) (citing surveys of high school students and extrapolating the failures
of educating entry level workers of their rights under the NLRA).
11. See Steven Greenhouse, New Rule Seen as Aid to Efforts To Unionize, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 25, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/26/business/labor-agency-to-require
-posting-unionization-rights.html?_r=0 (quoting various opinions of labor leaders
and trade group association executives and their differing viewpoints on the NLRB’s
authority to require notice postings).
12. See Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, 721 F.3d 152, 166 (4th Cir. 2013)
(invalidating the rule), aff’g 856 F. Supp. 2d 778, 796–97 (D.S.C. 2012); Nat’l Ass’n of
Mfrs., 717 F.3d at 963 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (invalidating the rule), aff’g in part, rev’g in part
846 F. Supp. 2d 34, 63 (D.D.C. 2012).
13. See Chamber of Commerce, 721 F.3d at 166 (invalidating the rule); Nat’l Ass’n of
Mfrs., 717 F.3d at 963 (invalidating the rule).
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the NLRB’s power to promulgate the notice-posting regulation and
other substantive rules.
Additionally, Part II addresses the
implications of a notice-posting regulation in light of protections
afforded to non-coercive speech under the Act. This focus will
address the poster’s function as a tool of government speech in the
discourse of labor law, as well as the critical ability of employers to
disavow any endorsement of the poster’s contents. Part III concludes
that the NLRB has the authority to promulgate the invalidated
regulation, and that courts should revisit and clarify the Board’s
authority in future challenges to its rulemakings.
I.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF NOTICE POSTER REGULATIONS
UNDER THE NLRA

A. General Overview of NLRB Jurisdiction and Authority
To aid in assessing the background and complications of the
NLRB’s notice-posting regulation, it is first necessary to review the
Board’s jurisdiction and authority. The NLRB is a quasi-judicial
independent agency tasked with enforcing the NLRA.14 Congress
established the NLRB in 1935 to address civil unrest surrounding
organized employment matters.15 The Board serves to encourage
and protect the right to collectively bargain, associate with unions,
organize labor, and negotiate employment terms through designated
representatives.16 To achieve these aims, the NLRA charges the
Board with enforcing section 7 of the Act, which articulates the
Congress provided a
inherent rights of labor organization.17
framework for identifying violations of section 7 rights in section 8 of
the NLRA, which defines prohibited unfair labor practices18 (“ULP”).
The Act divides ULP’s into several categories: illegal employer
actions, illegal union actions, protections of political viewpoints, the
obligation to honor collective bargaining efforts, contract
enforceability, and the right to strike.19 The mechanisms through
14. See 29 U.S.C. § 153 (2012) (outlining the Board’s composition as an
independent agency); id. § 160 (outlining the Board’s adjudicatory powers); id. § 156
(outlining the Board’s rulemaking powers).
15. See id. § 151 (providing the policy rationale and findings of fact that
prompted enactment of the NLRA).
16. Id.
17. See id. § 157 (delineating the rights to join unions and engage in concerted
activities for the purposes of collective bargaining as well as the right to refrain from
such activity).
18. See id. § 158 (outlining employer and union practices that are strictly
prohibited under the Act).
19. Id. § 158(a)–(g).
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which the Board may enforce the NLRA are restricted to two primary
means—adjudication20 and rulemaking.21
1.

NLRB adjudicatory powers
Until recently, the Board has primarily relied upon adjudications
to formulate labor policy.22 Scholars have taken particular interest in
this phenomenon, noting the various advantages and pitfalls of
approaching labor disputes solely through adjudications.23 As a
matter of form, the NLRB’s adjudicatory powers are strictly reactive.24
Congress restricted the NLRB’s investigative authority to a remedial
role—indicating in the NLRA’s legislative history that the Board may
not act in a “roving” manner to seek out and initiate investigations
absent a ULP charge.25 Accordingly, the NLRB cannot bring ULP
matters into adjudication proceedings sua sponte; the Board must
rely upon aggrieved parties to bring ULP allegations to the Board’s
attention.26 The limitations period for bringing such claims is
narrowly restricted to six months from the date of the alleged ULP.27
2.

NLRB rulemaking powers
In addition to adjudicating claims, the NLRB has the power to
promulgate regulations “necessary to carry out” the policy aims of the
NLRA.28
The Act’s legislative history indicates that Congress
20. Id. § 160(b) (describing the complaint process for bringing matters before
the Board for review).
21. Id. § 156 (providing that the NLRB has the ability to promulgate rules
necessary to enforce the provisions of the Act).
22. See Emily Baver, Comment, Setting Labor Policy Prospectively: Rulemaking,
Adjudicating, and What the NLRB Can Learn from the NMB’s Representation Election
Procedure Rule, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 853, 859 (2011) (noting the NLRB’s preference for
adjudication because it avoids the politics of labor that place strong pressure on the
formalized rulemaking process).
23. See Joan Flynn, The Costs and Benefits of “Hiding the Ball”: NLRB Policymaking
and the Failure of Judicial Review, 75 B.U. L. REV. 387, 394–95 (1995) (commenting on
the Board’s adjudicatory functions and the creation of “per se rule[s] in application”
pursuant to NLRB findings); Mark H. Grunewald, The NLRB’s First Rulemaking: An
Exercise in Pragmatism, 41 DUKE L.J. 274, 279 (1991) (noting the scrutiny of the
Board’s use of adjudication instead of rulemaking to set policy that resulted after the
Supreme Court’s decision in NLRB v. Wyman-Gordan Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969)).
24. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (providing that the Board may only initiate
investigations once it has received a complaint, thus limiting its powers to
independently commence investigations).
25. H.R. REP. NO. 74-972, at 22 (1935).
26. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (restricting the NLRB’s power to act unless a party files
a ULP charge with the Board).
27. Id.
28. Id. § 156; see also id. § 151 (noting the inequality between employees and
employers in the organization and negotiation of employment terms and the NLRA’s
general goal of “encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of
industrial disputes”).
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delegated rulemaking authority to the Board under the “customary”
This customary conferral
conferral of rulemaking powers.29
typically provides for substantive rulemaking to better define and
enforce an agency’s statutory authority. 30 Though sparsely used,
the Board possesses broad discretion to choose when it will set
policy through rulemaking.31
In 1947, Congress sought to amend the NLRA in concert with
newly prescribed rulemaking procedures set forth in the
Administrative Procedure Act.32 The amendments to the NLRA
altered the wording of the Board’s rulemaking authority but did not
alter the essential character and function of the Board’s power to
promulgate rules “necessary” to carry out the aims of the NLRA.33
29. See S. REP. NO. 74-573, at 2 (1935) (“Section 6. Rules and regulations—This
section follows the customary policy of giving the Board the power to make and
amend rules and regulations. Such rules and regulations become effective only
upon publication and there are no criminal penalties attached to their breach.”);
H.R. REP. NO. 74-972, at 13 (“Section 6: This is a common provision authorizing the
Board to make, amend, and rescind such rules and regulations as may be found
necessary to implement and carry out the provisions of the bill.”); see also Chamber of
Commerce v. NLRB, 856 F. Supp. 2d 778, 787 n.6 (D.S.C. 2012), aff’d, 721 F.3d 152
(4th Cir. 2013) (noting that Congress has inserted the same language contained in
the NLRA in the enabling statute for nearly 190 other administrative agencies).
30. See Mourning v. Family Publ’ns Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973) (“Where
the empowering provision of a statute states simply that the agency may ‘make . . .
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act,’
we have held that the validity of a regulation promulgated thereunder will be
sustained so long as it is ‘reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling
legislation.’” (internal citations omitted)); see also City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct.
1863, 1874 (2013) (holding that a “a general conferral of rulemaking or adjudicative
authority” is sufficient to support “deference for an exercise of that authority within
the agency’s substantive field”); Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United
States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 713–14 (2011) (holding that a general grant of rulemaking
authority requires judicial deference); United States v. Eurodif S.A., 555 U.S. 305,
319 (2009) (providing that the Supreme Court “look[s] to an authoritative agency
for a decision about the statute’s scope, which is defined in cases at the statutory
margin by the agency’s application of it, and once the choice is made [the Court]
ask[s] only whether the Department’s application was reasonable”).
31. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 295 (1974) (holding that the
Board has the choice between adjudicating matters or rulemaking, and that
adjudication “may also produce the relevant information necessary to mature and
fair consideration of the issues”); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202–03 (1947)
(providing that agencies are due deference in making determinations as to whether
to adjudicate matters or pursue rulemaking to solve general issues).
32. See Labor Management Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 6, 61 Stat. 136,
140 (1947) (amending the rulemaking statute to require the Board to promulgate
rules consistent with the Administrative Procedure Act, which, under 5 U.S.C. § 553,
requires notice and comment in rulemaking efforts).
33. See 29 U.S.C. § 156 (2012) (“The Board shall have authority from time to
time to make, amend, and rescind, in the manner prescribed in subchapter II of
chapter 5 of title 5, such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions of this subchapter.”); S. REP. NO. 80-105, at 20 (1947) (noting that the
revisions to the rule merely required the NLRB to post notices of rulemaking in the
federal register, consistent with the requirements under the Administrative
Procedure Act).
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The Act has been amended by Congress two additional times since
1947, but the rulemaking provisions have remained untouched.34
a.

Procedural and housekeeping rulemaking

Despite Congress’s conferral of rulemaking authority, the NLRB
has been reticent to exercise its power to issue regulations.35 For
decades, courts, interested parties, and scholars have urged the Board
to use its rulemaking authority.36 Notwithstanding these appeals for
more regulatory action, the Board remained reluctant in its
rulemaking efforts, promulgating only a mere “smattering of
procedural, privacy, and housekeeping rules.”37 These regulations
are limited to the form and practice before the NLRB, and serve to
codify the guidelines for various Board functions and adjudicatory
matters.38 In essence, the Board’s housekeeping rules are best
classified as either non-binding guidance39 or procedural rules akin
34. See Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395 (leaving section 6
intact); Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86257, 73 Stat. 519 (same); Labor Management Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 6,
61 Stat. 136, 140 (1947) (amending section 6).
35. See Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Potential of Rulemaking by the NLRB, 5 FLA. INT’L U.
L. REV. 411, 413 (2010) (noting that the Board has only passed a few regulations in
its existence); Cornelius J. Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the National Labor
Relations Board, 70 YALE L.J. 729, 732 (1961) (“The NLRB has issued no formal rules
other than those governing the practice and procedure to be followed in cases
brought before the agency. This is not for lack of statutory authorization to make
substantive rules.”); Note, NLRB Rulemaking: Political Reality Versus Procedural Fairness,
89 YALE L.J. 982, 983 (1980) (“[T]he NLRB’s reliance on adjudication has been to
minimize congressional and judicial intervention in the Board’s policies.”).
36. See Charles J. Morris, The NLRB in the Dog House—Can an Old Board Learn New
Tricks?, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9, 27–28 (1987) (positing that the NLRB should engage
in substantive rulemaking to provide legal doctrine that is not tethered to the
specific factual nature of adjudicated standards); Peck, supra note 35, at 730–31
(arguing that the Board’s decision to forgo rulemaking is improper). In addition to
pressure from scholars, Judge Friendly of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit issued a number of opinions urging the Board to adopt regulatory standards
for policy making over adjudication. See, e.g., NLRB v. Penn Cork & Closures, Inc.,
376 F.2d 52, 57 (2d Cir. 1967) (urging the Board to utilize the preferable method of
rulemaking to address union-security agreement standards); NLRB v. Majestic
Weaving Co., 355 F.2d 854, 860 (2d Cir. 1966) (arguing that the Board has failed to
take advantage of regulating the labor industry through rulemaking); NLRB v. A.P.W.
Prods. Co., 316 F.2d 899, 905 (2d Cir. 1963) (noting that the NLRB, like many other
agencies, can use rule-making power to concretely express and apply rules formulated
through adjudication of claims (citing Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. at 202)).
37. Lubbers, supra note 35, at 412.
38. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 100.201 (2013) (providing guidelines for audits and
investigations); id. § 101.601 (providing the scope and purpose of regulations
governing NLRB debt collection efforts); id. § 102.139 (providing guidelines for
notice of closed meetings pursuant to the Sunshine Act (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c));
id. § 102.178 (providing guidance that the NLRB shall continue operations when the
Board lacks a full quorum).
39. E.g., OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, NLRB, GC NO. 11-01, EFFECTIVE REMEDIES
IN ORGANIZING CAMPAIGNS (2010), available at 2010 WL 7141477. Statements of
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to guidelines and court rules.40 It was not until the late 1980s, nearly
half a century since Congress first established the Board, that the
NLRB finally exercised its authority to promulgate substantive rules.41
b.

Substantive rulemaking

The Board has struggled to promulgate substantive rules that
address statutory interstitial matters against the backdrop of
longstanding public debate over its rulemaking authority.42 For
decades, the NLRB’s substantive rulemaking power remained
untested—leaving the Board open to speculation that Congress did
not delegate the NLRB with the power to promulgate substantive
regulations.43 In 1989, the Board finally confronted the act of
substantive rulemaking when it promulgated a regulation classifying
collective bargaining units in the health care industry.44 Inundated
with an increasing caseload of health care related filings, the Board
moved to universally classify health care bargaining units to promote
judicial efficiency.45

general policy and interpretive rules, such as NLRB general counsel memoranda, are
typically exempted from APA formal and informal rulemaking requirements. See 5
U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2012).
40. Compare 29 C.F.R. 102.14 (providing guidelines for service of process in
matters filed with the Board), with FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c) (providing guidelines for
service of process in matters filed with federal courts).
41. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 608 (1991) (proclaiming that the
NLRB promulgated a substantive rule “[f]or the first time since the National Labor
Relations Board . . . was established in 1935”).
42. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (defining the term “rule” to
include the prescription of “law or policy”); National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 156 (providing that the NLRB has the power to promulgate rules necessary to aid
in enforcing other provisions within the act); Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 499 U.S. at 613
(holding that Congress would have curtailed rulemaking authority provided to the
Board in the other sections of the Act if it intended to limit such powers from
substantive matters); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947) (describing the
quasi-legislative function of filling the interstices of a statute’s ambiguity).
43. See Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 393, 407 (1981) (noting that the NLRB “has acted as little more than an umpire
in disputes between organized labor and management”); Thomas W. Merrill &
Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116
HARV. L. REV. 467, 566 (2002) (arguing that “an anti-labor, Republican-led” Congress
had no intention of providing for legislative rulemaking power when it amended the
NLRA in 1947).
44. See Collective-Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry, 54 Fed. Reg.
16,336 (Apr. 21, 1989) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 103 (1990)).
45. See Scott A. Zebrak, Comment, The Future of NLRB Rulemaking: Analyzing the
Mixed Signals Sent by the Implementation of the Health Care Bargaining Unit Rule and by the
Proposed Beck Union Dues Regulation, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 125, 145 n.111 (1994)
(discussing the voluminous amount of health care litigation before the Board
promulgated the health care bargaining unit regulation).
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This lone experiment in substantive rulemaking drew opposition
from business and trade associations,46 igniting litigation that
ultimately concluded at the Supreme Court.47 In American Hospital
Ass’n v. NLRB48 (“AHA”), the Court held that the Board possesses the
power to promulgate rules that address issues “in advance” of
foreseeable NLRA-related matters.49 Examining the structure of the
NLRA and the expressions of Congress when it delegated rulemaking
authority to the Board, the Court concluded that the Board’s “goal of
facilitating the organization and recognition of unions” served as
permissible justification for promulgating proactive rules under the
bounds of the NLRA.50
B. An Educational Measure: Notice-Posting Requirements in the
Employment Context
Notice-posting requirements are common in the workplace, serving
to inform workers of employment-related rights under various federal
and state laws.51 Congress has expressly legislated notice-posting
requirements in several employment related areas. These laws notify
workers of their rights under landmark statutes such as Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act,52 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,53
the Occupational Safety and Health Act,54 the Americans With
Disabilities Act,55 and the Family and Medical Leave Act.56 Each of
these required posters serves to alert workers of their rights and the
statutory limitations that govern the exercise and enforcement of

46. Id. at 158 (noting that political opposition may serve as an obstacle to rulemaking).
47. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 499 U.S. at 606.
48. 499 U.S. 606 (1991).
49. Id. at 613.
50. Id. (emphasis added).
51. See DeChiara, supra note 10, at 439–43 (surveying other notice-posting
requirements in both employment and non-employment contexts that provide
notice of safety hazards, anti-discrimination rights, wage and hours limits, and civil
rights protections in the employment forum).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-10 (2012) (providing notice of “excerpts, from or,
summaries of, the pertinent provisions” in the Family Medical Leave Act).
53. 29 U.S.C. § 627 (requiring employers to post notices “setting forth
information as the [Equal Employment Opportunity] Commission deems
appropriate” to carry out the statute); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1601.30 (2013) (compelling
notices under various Title VII provisions).
54. 29 U.S.C. § 657(c) (requiring notices to inform employees of their rights and
protections under the Occupational Safety and Hazard Act).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 12115 (requiring employers to “post notices in an accessible
format to applicants, employees, and members describing the applicable provisions
of” the Americans with Disabilities Act).
56. 29 U.S.C. § 2619(a) (compelling the posting of a notice “setting forth
excerpts from, or summaries of, the pertinent provisions” of the Family Medical
Leave Act).
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those rights.57 Failure to comply with these posting requirements
can, in some cases, lead to punitive or remedial damages.58
Recognizing the important educational function these posters
bring to the workplace, courts have placed a high premium on their
presence.59 In controversies where an employer fails to display a
notice poster, whether intentionally or inadvertently, courts can waive
the statute of limitations under the doctrine of equitable tolling.60
This legal doctrine applies to cases where a plaintiff brings a
claim beyond the time allotted by the statute, and such
untimeliness is not the product of bad faith.61 A court will only
prescribe equitable tolling of a statute’s limitation period if it
determines, based upon balancing factors, that the circumstances
materially prejudiced the plaintiff.62
When applying the doctrine of equitable tolling to federal
employment laws, most circuits consider an employer’s failure to post
as a contributing factor to a plaintiff’s ignorance of the law.63 The
57. See Poster Page: Workplace Poster Requirements for Small and Businesses and Other
Employers, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/oasam/boc/osdbu/sbrefa/poster
/matrix.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2014) (containing links to digital copies of various
employment related posters).
58. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 2619(b) (providing penalties for violating the noticeposting requirement).
59. See, e.g., Mercado v. Ritz-Carlton San Juan Hotel, Spa & Casino, 410 F.3d 41,
46 (1st Cir. 2005) (tolling the statute of limitations pursuant to an employer’s failure
to post a required notice poster under the equal employment opportunity act).
60. Id.
61. See Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 349 (1874) (discussing the deeply
rooted origins of equitable tolling in common law to remedy fraud that “prevent[s]
parties from asserting rights after the lapse of time had destroyed or impaired the
evidence which would show that such rights never existed, or had been satisfied,
transferred, or extinguished, if they ever did exist”). The doctrine of equitable
tolling provides five factors that must be balanced in order to determine if a waiver of
timely requirements is permissible: (1) plaintiffs must lack notice of the limitation
period, (2) notice cannot be constructively formed, (3) the plaintiff must pursue
claims in good faith, (4) any prejudice to the defendant must be balanced, and (5)
the court must weigh and consider the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s ignorance of
the limitation period. See Barry v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 721, 724 (6th Cir. 2008) (listing
the five factors).
62. See Bailey, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 348 (holding that in suits in equity the weight
of authority is in favor of the idea that where the party is unaware of it, the statutory
bar does not run until the party becomes aware of the fraud); see also Adam Bain &
Ugo Colella, Interpreting Federal Statutes of Limitations, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 493, 514–
16 (2004) (reviewing Supreme Court precedent on material afflictions caused by
defendant misconduct and fraudulent concealment that ultimately prejudice a
plaintiff’s ability to viably bring a claim within statutorily limited filing periods).
63. See Mercado, 410 F.3d at 46 (applying equitable tolling for failure to post
under title VII); EEOC v. Ky. State Police Dep’t, 80 F.3d 1086, 1094–95 (6th Cir.
1996) (applying equitable tolling for failure to post under the ADEA); Beshears v.
Asbill, 930 F.2d 1348, 1352 (8th Cir. 1991) (noting that claims may be equitably
tolled where an employer fails to show that the employee was unaware of his or her
rights and no notice was posted); Vance v. Whirlpool Corp., 716 F.2d 1010, 1012 (4th
Cir. 1983) (finding implied intent that congress would allow for equitable tolling of
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judicial impetus supporting notice posters provides substantial weight
and legitimacy to the posters’ presence in the workplace.64 Given the
equalizing powers that notice posters provide—notice of substantive
rights, or, alternatively, protections where notice is not provided—it
comes as no surprise that the NLRB would seek to promulgate a
notice-posting requirement similar to those contained in other
federal statutes.65
As professed in the Board’s notice of proposed rulemaking,
“unions have been a traditional source of information about the
NLRA’s provisions.”66 Over the last forty years, union density has
steadily declined in the private sector workforce.67 The stark decline
in union activity has negatively impacted the public’s general
awareness of labor rights afforded under section 7 of the Act.68 A
poster providing notice of rights under the NLRA supplements the
knowledge gap created by a decline in union activism and provides
workers with information about their rights to organize and engage
in concerted activities.69 Moreover, an NLRA poster provides notice
of both the legal remedies available under the Act and the short six
month limitations period to file ULP claims.70

title VII); Elliott v. Grp. Med. & Surgical Serv., 714 F.2d 556, 563 (5th Cir. 1983)
(holding that failure to comply with statutory notice provision “vitiates the normal
assumption that an employee is aware of his rights”); Posey v. Skyline Corp., 702 F.2d
102, 104 (7th Cir. 1983) (“[T]he 180 day period in which a charge must be filed
with the EEOC is not absolute but is subject to equitable modification.” (citing
Kephart v. Inst. of Gas Tech., 581 F.2d 1287, 1289 (7th Cir. 1978))). But see
Wilkerson v. Siegfried Ins. Agency, Inc., 683 F.2d 344, 347 (10th Cir. 1982)
(finding that failure to post does not automatically trigger equitable tolling absent
any intentional misconduct).
64. See Notification of Employee Rights Under the National Labor Relations
Act, 76 Fed. Reg., 54,006, 54,034 (Aug. 30, 2011) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 104)
(arguing that equitable tolling is a matter of fairness that is important in the
employment forum).
65. See id. (arguing that the application of equitable tolling to an NLRB poster
rule prevents unfairness and deprivation of legal protections that are afforded to
aggrieved employees under the Act).
66. Id. at 54,011.
67. See Amanda L. Ireland, Note, Notification of Employee Rights Under the National
Labor Relations Act: A Turning Point for the National Labor Relations Board, 13 NEV. L.J.
937, 943–46 (2013) (providing an overview of the decline in union density from the
1970s through today, outlining some of the thematic and economic societal
transformations contributing to decreased union participation).
68. Id.
69. See Employee Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act, supra note 5
(outlining the rights of laborers to unionize and be free of coercive antiunion tactics
by employers).
70. Id.
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C. The NLRB’s Long Path To Promulgation of a
Notice-Posting Requirement

The Board’s consideration of a notice-posting requirement has
endured longstanding pendency and political battles. In the midnineties, academics and union-rights organizers strongly urged the
Board to promulgate a notice-posting requirement.71 The Board did
not easily adopt these persuasions,72 but one particular request
withstood the test of time to influence the Board’s eventual
promulgation of a notice-posting requirement.73 In 1993, Charles J.
Morris, a professor at Southern Methodist University Dedman School
of Law, filed a rulemaking petition with the NLRB urging the Board
to promulgate a regulation to require compulsory notice-postings.74
At the time of Professor Morris’s filing, the NLRB was deliberating
over a different and narrowly tailored notice requirement pursuant to
71. See DeChiara, supra note 10, at 437 (noting several case studies and examples
that illustrate a general lack of awareness about unionization rights under the
NLRA); Charles J. Morris, Renaissance at the NLRB—Opportunity and Prospect for NonLegislative Procedural Reform at the Labor Board, 23 STETSON L. REV. 101, 111–12 (1993)
(urging the Board to adopt a broad notice-posting regulation to inform employees of
their substantive rights).
72. After the NLRB promulgated its health care bargaining unit regulation, the
Administrative Conference of the United States (“ACUS”) issued recommendation
91-5 which urged the Board to develop policies through rulemaking instead of
adjudications. See Facilitating the Use of Rulemaking by the National Labor
Relations Board, 1 C.F.R. § 305.91-5 (1992).
In consideration of ACUS’s
recommendation, the Board initially moved to promulgate a notice regulation. See
Union Dues Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 43,635, 43,635–36 (proposed Sep. 22, 1992)
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 103) (referring to ACUS recommendation 91-5 as
persuasive in the Board’s considerations to engage in rulemaking). While it seemed
plausible that the Board would move in the direction of regulating more proactively,
this effort was short lived in favor of case-by-case adjudication and the issuance of
non-binding guidance. See Rules and Procedures for the Implementation of
Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988), 61 Fed. Reg. 11,167 (proposed
Mar. 19, 1996) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 102) (withdrawing the Board’s
proposed regulation); see also OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, NLRB, GC NO. 88-14,
GUIDELINES CONCERNING CWA V. BECK (1988) [hereinafter NLRB GC 88-14
GUIDELINES], available at 1988 WL 236187 (issuing non-binding interpretive guidance
on Beck related matters).
73. See Proposed Rules Governing Notification of Employee Rights Under the
National Labor Relations Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 80,410, 80,411 (proposed Dec. 22, 2010)
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 104) (mentioning the rulemaking petition of
Professor Charles J. Morris as the earliest influencing factor in the Board’s decision
to promulgate the notice-posting regulation).
74. See Petition of Charles J. Morris, an Interested Person, for the Amendment of
Proposed Regulations or, in the Alternative, for the Issuance of a New General Rule
Regarding Information Posting, Rulemaking Regarding Union Dues Regulations
(N.L.R.B. Feb. 9, 1993) [hereinafter Morris Petition] (copy on file with the author);
see also Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2012) (“Each agency shall
give an interested person the right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or
repeal of a rule.”); 29 C.F.R. § 102.124 (2013) (“Any interested person may
petition the Board, in writing, for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule
or regulation.”).
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the Supreme Court’s ruling in Communications Workers of America v.
Beck.75 Professor Morris saw the Board’s effort to promulgate a
narrowly tailored notice requirement as an ideal opportunity to
persuade the NLRB to think more broadly about notice requirements
and rulemaking.76
Professor Morris’s rulemaking petition appealed to the idea of
promoting even-handed notification of employee rights under the
NLRA, noting that most employees are “unaware of the existence of
the Board and have no knowledge of what it is supposed to do.”77
Much of Professor Morris’s request eventually manifested in the
notice-posting regulation promulgated by the Board in 2011.78
However, political and legal considerations served to dampen NLRB
efforts to move forward with promulgating a notice-posting
requirement during the petition’s nearly twenty-year pendency.79
1. The NLRB’s weak attempt to promulgate requirements for union notice to
nonmember employees pursuant to Communications Workers of America
v. Beck
In reaction to the Supreme Court’s decision in Beck, the NLRB
considered codifying a regulation requiring that unions provide
notice to nonmembers of their right to withhold funding support for
certain union activities.80 In Beck, the Supreme Court resolved a
circuit split regarding the permissible use of union fees from
nonmember employees that benefited from collective bargaining
agreements.81 Union-security agreements grant unions the ability to
collect fees from nonmember employees that receive the benefit of

75. 487 U.S. 735, 762–63 (1988) (holding that unions could only collect fees
from nonmembers for duties the union performed in its capacity as the sole
representative of the employees).
76. See Morris Petition, supra note 74, at 3–4 (“There is no good reason why
notices of other federal statutory rights affecting employees but not comparable
notices regarding rights and duties under the National Labor Relations Act should
be found on employee bulletin boards throughout the country.”).
77. Id. at 2.
78. See infra notes 150–66 and accompanying text (summarizing the NLRB’s
notice-posting regulation which provides notice of general rights under the NLRA).
79. See infra notes 106–41 and accompanying text (discussing the revolving standard
of issuing and repealing notice requirements in the federal government workplace).
80. Implementation of Supreme Court’s Decision in Communications Workers of
America v. Beck, 57 Fed. Reg. 7,897 (proposed Mar. 5, 1992) (calling for comment
submissions regarding a potential regulation codifying labor union duties pursuant
to Beck).
81. Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1988) (restating
claims against the validity of employer-union agreements that enable collection of
agency fees for purposes other than collective bargaining, contract administration, or
grievance proceedings).
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collective bargaining despite their dissociation with organized labor.82
This measure prevents nonmembers from free riding the concerted
and costly efforts of union representation and negotiation.83 The
Beck case addressed a union’s use of nonmember “agency fees” for
non-administrative or political purposes.84 Twenty nonmember
employees filed suit against a union asserting that the use of agency
fees for purposes other than contract administration vitiated their
express disassociation with unions.85 The use of nonmember agency
fees for political purposes, they argued, treated nonmember
contributions as the functional equivalent of union dues.86
Circuit courts had offered varying opinions on the permissible uses
of nonmember dues.87 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held that unions could only use nonmember dues for the
purpose of administering and negotiating collective bargaining
agreements.88 Alternatively, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that courts could not interfere with the use of
nonmember agency fees because it was a private matter of union
expenditure.89
To remedy these incongruent holdings, the
Supreme Court concluded that unions could only assess fees
necessary to “performing the duties of an exclusive representative

82. See NLRB. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742–43 (1963) (concluding
that Congress intended to prevent nonmembers from receiving the free benefit of
union representation by authorizing union-security agreements with employers to
compel nonmember contribution (citing Radio Officers’ Union of the Commercial
Tel. Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 41 (1954))).
83. Id. at 741 (recounting the intentions of Congress when it enacted the NLRA
to encourage union participation by eliminating the ability of nonmember
employees to benefit from union activities without paying dues).
84. Beck, 487 U.S. at 745.
85. Id. at 739; see also id. at 748–49 (discussing the legislative history of
nonmember fee assessments and the NLRA).
86. Id. at 739–40 (contemplating whether the use of nonmember fees for nonadministrative purposes violates the union’s “duty of fair representation”). The
NLRA permits unions, through union security agreements with employers, to assess
fees from nonunion employees who are the beneficiaries of collective bargaining.
Gen. Motors Corp., 373 U.S. at 742–43. This measure serves to protect the interests of
collective bargaining by eliminating free benefits for employees that are subject to a
collective bargaining agreement but not a member of the negotiating union. Id. at 745.
87. Beck, 487 U.S. at 740–41 (highlighting a conflict between the Second and
Fourth Circuits).
88. See Beck v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 776 F.2d 1187, 1209 (4th Cir. 1985)
(holding that unions may compel nonmembers to pay for administrative costs, but
nonmembers are “entitled to a refund of any amount collected of them by the union
beyond these costs” (internal quotations omitted)), aff’d, 487 U.S. 735.
89. See Price v. Int’l Union, United Auto. Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers
of Am., 795 F.2d 1128, 1135 (2d Cir. 1986), (holding that a union does not act
arbitrarily or in bad faith by spending union-security agreement funds for nonadministrative purposes), vacated, 487 U.S. 1229 (1988) (mem.).
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of the employees in dealing with the employer on labormanagement issues.”90
After Beck, the NLRB struggled to find a constructive means of
enforcing the Court’s newly created rule governing agency fee
expenditures.91
Initially, the Board’s General Counsel issued
guidelines regarding the implementation of the Beck decision.92 The
General Counsel memo provided that unions have “an obligation to
notify nonmember employees” of three matters: (1) total use of funds
for nonrepresentational activities, (2) the right to object to such use,
and (3) the right for nonmembers to limit the use of their
contributions to representational matters only.93 In an effort to
codify the General Counsel’s memorandum, the NLRB sought to
promulgate a regulation that would require “all employees covered
by contractual union-security clauses, whether union members or
nonmembers, [to be] informed of their rights” afforded by the
Beck decision.94
Professor Morris saw the Board’s efforts to codify Beck as an
opportunity to form a regulatory policy that provided broad notice to
employees covered under the NLRA.95 Coloring the proposed Beck
regulation as a one-sided provision, Morris argued that the Board
should proceed with the broader purpose of providing notice of all
substantive employee rights afforded under the Act.96 In contrast to
Professor Morris’s position, the Board’s proposed regulation limited
notice requirements to nonmember agency fees and skirted the issue
of providing comprehensive notice to nonmembers of other rights
afforded under the NLRA.97 Despite compelling arguments for both
broad and narrow notice-posting requirements,98 the Board never
completed its process of formalizing the Beck regulation.99
90. Beck, 487 U.S. at 762–63 (quoting Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks,
466 U.S. 435, 448 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
91. See Brian J. Woldow, Comment, The NLRB’s (Slowly) Developing Beck
Jurisprudence: Defending a Right in a Politicized Agency, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1075, 1082–85
(2000) (discussing the NLRB’s attempts to enforce the Beck notice rule without a
governing regulation).
92. NLRB GC 88-14 GUIDELINES, supra note 72.
93. Id. at *1 (emphasis added).
94. Union Dues Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 43,635, 43,641 (proposed Sept. 22,
1992) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 103.40).
95. See Morris Petition, supra note 74, at 4 (“Petitioner hereby proposes that the
pending Rulemaking Proceeding regarding the Beck rules . . . be amended, i.e.
expanded, to encompass the issuance of a broad rule.”).
96. Id.
97. 57 Fed. Reg. at 43,636 (outlining the Board’s efforts to codify notice
requirements that only detail a nonmember’s rights under union-security agreements).
98. Compare DeChiara, supra note 10, at 461–63 (arguing that a broad notice
poster would provide workers with knowledge of their rights and deter employers
from retaliating against employees who exercise their rights), with Rex H. Reed,
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The NLRB showed its reluctance to promulgate regulations by
abandoning its efforts to codify Beck in favor of individualized
adjudication.100 In California Saw & Knife Works,101 the Board
prescribed that a “[u]nion has an obligation under the duty of fair
representation to give Beck rights notice” to nonmember
employees.102 Over time, the Board has expressed an implied Beck
rule that can be synthesized through its adjudications of Beck related
matters.103 In response, unions have deployed informal notices to
nonmembers of the right to object to agency fee expenditures.104
Although an implied rule exists pursuant to Beck and California Saw,
the Board’s decision to forgo codification of a notice-posting
requirement has left the matter of NLRA-related notice postings
relatively unguided and without the aid of a regulation.105

Revolution Ahead: Communications Workers v. Beck, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 635,
655–56 (1990) (arguing that Beck notices provide nonmembers with political and
economic freedom to abstain from supporting union activity that is highly influential
on the political and legislative process).
99. See Rules and Procedures for the Implementation of Communications Workers
v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988), 61 Fed. Reg. 11,167 (proposed Mar. 19, 1996) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 102) (withdrawing the Board’s proposed rule, and noting
that the Board has addressed Beck rights through adjudication and will continue to
adjudicate Beck issues); see also Woldow, supra note 91, at 1082–83 (discussing the
NLRB’s attempts at enforcing the Beck notice rule without a governing regulation).
100. The NLRB did not hear its first case addressing non-member union
assessments until 1995. See Cal. Saw & Knife Works, 320 N.L.R.B. 224, 231–36 (1995)
(providing analysis and guidance of proper notification procedures to nonmember
employees). The Board has continued to address some of the minutiae of the Beck
notice requirement. See, e.g., Am. Fed’n of Television & Recording Artists, 327
N.L.R.B. 474, 476 (1999) (clarifying accounting and audit procedures to ensure
compliance with Beck notice disclosures); Transp. Workers of Am., 329 N.L.R.B. 543,
544 (1999) (qualifying that expenses incurred by union representatives in the course
of meeting with governmental agencies to discuss “activities that are representational
in nature and attributable to the objecting nonmembers own bargaining unit” are
chargeable under a union security agreement even though they may appear to be
political in nature).
101. 320 N.L.R.B. 224 (1995).
102. Id. at 231.
103. See Woldow, supra note 91, at 1092–95 (describing the Board’s slow
development of Beck notice requirements and providing suggestions for future
enforcement and adjudication).
104. See, e,g., Beck Rights Notice: Notice to Musicians Employed Under US Collective
Bargaining Agreements, AM. FED’N OF MUSICIANS, http://www.afm.org/why-join/u-s-benefits
/beck-rights-notice (last visited Jan. 16, 2014); Notice to all Union and Nonunion
Members Regarding Their Rights Under NLRB v. Gen. Motors and CWA v. Beck, MARINE
ENGINEERS’ BENEFICIAL ASS’N, http://mebaunion.org/PDF/Beck_Rights.pdf (last
visited Jan. 16, 2014); Union Security Agreements: Notice to Persons Covered by Union
Security Agreements Regulated Under the National Labor Relations Act, INT’L UNION, UNION
AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE & AGRIC. IMPLEMENT WORKERS AM., http://www.uaw.org/beck
(last visited Jan. 16, 2014).
105. See Woldow, supra note 91, at 1093–96 (recounting the challenges with the
NLRB’s structure that dampen the effect of judicially enforcing Beck).
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2. Congress and the White House spin their wheels—limited efforts of
support and disapproval for notice-posting requirements under the NLRA
Without a formal notice regulation in place, Congress and the
White House grappled with compulsory notice-postings under the
NLRA. Over the course of twenty years, four different Presidents
ordered and repealed various NLRA notice-posting requirements.106
Political divisions between the pro-union Democratic Party agenda107
and the pro-management Republican Party agenda108 dictated the
breadth and scope of each administration’s effort to define notice
requirements under the NLRA.109 The bulk of these executively
ordered requirements provided limited information to employees
and sought to enforce the Beck rights that Professor Morris
challenged as narrow and one-sided.110 Additionally, throughout the
mid-nineties, the Republican-controlled Congress, in the midst of party
gridlock, recognized the NLRB’s reluctance to promulgate a Beck
notice regulation, and it attempted, but failed, to legislate a
compulsory notice-posting requirement.111
These executive and
legislative efforts fell short of providing notice to employees of all
rights afforded under the NLRA—protracting the call for an
informative and broad NLRA notice-posting requirement for decades.

106. See infra notes 112–41 and accompanying text (chronicling the efforts of
the executive branch to supplement the NLRB’s lack of effort to codify Beck
notice requirements).
107. See DEMOCRATIC NAT’L CONVENTION, MOVING AMERICA FORWARD: 2012
DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL PLATFORM 10–11 (2012), available at http://assets.dstatic.org/dnc
-platform/2012-National-Platform.pdf (expounding the Democratic Party’s unwavering
support for labor laws that protect union activity).
108. See REPUBLICAN NAT’L CONVENTION, WE BELIEVE IN AMERICA: 2012 REPUBLICAN
PLATFORM 7–8 (2012), available at http://www.gop.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/08
/2012GOPPlatform.pdf (expounding the Republican Party’s vision for a workforce
unencumbered by union activity).
109. See Joe Knollenberg, The Changing of the Guard: Republicans Take on Labor and
the Use of Mandatory Dues or Fees for Political Purposes, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 347, 349
(1998) (detailing the Republican agenda and interest in enforcing Beck notice
requirements); David M. Burns, Comment, Requiring Unions To Notify Covered
Employees of Their Right To Be an Agency Fee Payer in the Post Beck Era, 48 CATH. U. L.
REV. 475, 481–82 (1999) (recounting the politics surrounding the first Bush and the
Clinton administrations’ treatment of Beck notices).
110. See supra notes 71–76 and accompanying text.
111. See Worker Right To Know Act, H.R. 3580, 104th Cong. § 6 (1996) (requiring
that employers provide notice to nonmembers of their rights to refuse certain uses of
agency fees); see also Worker Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R. 1625, 105th Cong. § 5
(1997) (requiring notice postings for employees subject to a union-security
agreement workplace); Knollenberg, supra note 109, at 357, 361 (recounting the
failure of legislative efforts to codify Beck notices “mostly along party lines”).
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a.

Beck notices during the George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton presidencies

In April of 1992, President George H. W. Bush issued Executive
Order 12,800112 instructing the Secretary of Labor to promulgate a
regulation implementing the Beck decision for all government
contractors.113 With the NLRB on the sidelines and a pro-union
Congress in power, the President’s efforts provided the only avenue
for codifying Beck notices.114 However, this effort failed when
President Bush lost his bid for reelection. Just a few months after
coming into office, President Clinton repealed Executive Order
12,800 with his own Order 12,836.115
In response to President Clinton’s express disapproval of Beck
notices, the Republican-controlled Congress of the mid-nineties
sought to enact its own solution.116 From 1996 to 1999, Congress
considered three different bills that would have codified Beck notice
requirements.117 Each bill failed, leaving the issue of notice under
the NLRA to the Board’s developing Beck jurisprudence.118
b.

Restoration of Beck notices during President George W. Bush’s Presidency

After taking office in 2000, President George W. Bush rolled back
President Clinton’s Executive Order to reinstate Beck notice

112. Exec. Order No. 12,800, 3 C.F.R. 290 (1993).
113. See id. at 291 (issuing compulsory notice language informing nonmember
employees of their right to object to the use of their contribution for certain
purposes); see also Obligations of Federal Contractors and Subcontractors; Notice of
Employee Rights Concerning Payment of Union Dues or Fees, 57 Fed. Reg. 33,403
(proposed July 24, 2013) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 470) (providing that the
proposed regulation will require contractors to post notices to employees of their
rights to object to uses of agency fees).
114. See Knollenberg, supra note 109, at 347–50 (recounting Representative
Knollenberg’s experiences as a freshman member in the early 1990s, and the
limitations placed upon the republican agenda to implement Beck when the
democratic party retained control over Congress).
115. Exec. Order No. 12,836, 3 C.F.R. 588 (1994) (revoking Exec. Order No. 12,800).
116. See Knollenberg, supra note 109, at 349 (“Republicans, nonetheless, have
continued to push for Beck legislation.”).
117. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 1999, S. 1593, 106th Cong. § 5 (1999)
(seeking to amend section 8 of the NLRA to make it “an unfair labor practice” for
any labor organization to assess nonmember agency fees and to fail to establish
guidelines for providing notice to nonmembers); Worker Paycheck Fairness Act,
H.R. 1625, 105th Cong. § 5 (1997) (requiring employers to post notices informing
employees of applicable union security agreements, and creating the affirmative duty
for unions to secure authorization for certain uses of nonmember agency fees);
Worker Right To Know Act, H.R. 3580, 104th Cong. § 6 (1996) (obligating
employers to post notices of employee rights under section 7, and clarifying the
permissible and restricted uses of agency fees paid by nonmembers).
118. Though Congress and the President failed to codify Beck notice-posting
requirements, the Board did adjudicate the issue on a number of occasions
throughout the 1990s. See supra note 100.
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requirements for government contractors.119 Section 2 of Executive
Order 13,201 required government contractors to “post a notice”
informing workers of their rights to object to a union’s use of security
agreement fees for non-administrative purposes.120 This time the
President’s Executive Order resulted in the codification of a
regulation.121 Though the Board was reluctant to promulgate its own
Beck regulation,122 it did offer interpretive guidance of Beck notices in
response to President Bush’s Executive Order.123
Unions opposing Executive Order 13,201 moved to invalidate the
regulation, asserting that the NLRA preempts compulsory display of
Beck notice posters. In UAW-Labor Employment & Training Corp. v.
Chao,124 three unions and a federal contractor sued to enjoin
President Bush’s notice-posting requirement.125
The unions
mounted a two-pronged argument against the regulation. First, they
argued that the NLRA explicitly preempted the regulation because it
prevents states and other actors, here the President, from setting
standards inconsistent with the Act.126 Second, the unions argued
that section 8(c) of the NLRA preempted the essence of the
regulation because the rule compelled union speech.127 Section 8(c)
of the NLRA provides that:
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the
dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or
visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor
practice under any of the provisions of this subchapter, if such
expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of
benefit.128

The unions asserted that the message compelled by Executive
Order 13,201 violated their right to refrain from the

119. Exec. Order No. 13,201, 3 C.F.R. 754 (2002) (issued Feb. 17, 2001).
120. Id. at 755.
121. 29 C.F.R. § 470.1–470.23 (2005).
122. See supra notes 100–05 and accompanying text.
123. See generally OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, NLRB, GC NO. 01-04, GUIDELINES
FOR RESPONSE TO BECK-RELATED PUBLIC INQUIRIES (2001), available at 2001 WL 988353
(issuing non-binding interpretive guidance in connection with an executively
ordered Beck notice requirement).
124. 325 F.3d 360 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
125. Id. at 362.
126. See Final Brief for Appellees at 12, UAW-Labor Emp’t & Training Corp., 325
F.3d 360 (No. 02-5080) (providing a three-pronged test to determine whether a labor
related law is preempted by the NLRA (citing Wis. Dep’t of Indus., Labor & Human
Relations v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 286 (1986))).
127. See id. at 13 (arguing that section 8(c) protects the right of employers to
engage freely in non-coercive speech regarding labor relations matters, including the
right to refrain from speaking on the topic).
128. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2012).
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dissemination of speech in violation of section 8(c)’s protection
of labor-related speech. 129
Rejecting the arguments advanced by the unions, a divided panel
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held
that the NLRA did not preempt the President’s Beck notice-posting
rule.130 Looking to the substance of the regulation—the requirement
that employers post notices regarding Beck rights—the D.C. Circuit
concluded that the NLRA did not preempt the President’s order
because the Act only preempts laws that adversely regulate matters
that are protected by the NLRA.131 UAW-Labor Employment & Training
Corp. involved a notice poster containing a restatement of rights that
the Supreme Court interpreted from the NLRA in its Beck decision.132
The court rejected arguments that the poster adversely regulated the
protections offered by the Act.133 In response to arguments that a
compulsory notice-posting requirement violates a union’s speech
rights under Section 8(c) of the Act, the D.C. Circuit held that the
compulsory rule does not violate the NLRA because the Act does
not protect against compulsory disclosure of legal rights.134 With
the Beck notice requirement affirmed, federal contractors remained
129. See Final Brief for Appellees, supra note 126, at 13 (suggesting that the
Executive Order compels an employer to speak when the employer is protected from
such compulsory requirements under the Act).
130. UAW-Labor Emp’t & Training Corp., 325 F.3d at 366.
131. The D.C. Circuit highlighted two categories of preemption analysis for
federal labor law that govern the assessment of whether a law or regulation violates
the NLRA. Id. at 362–63 (providing that federal labor law preempts matters that are
arguably protected by the NLRA, and laws that frustrate the bargaining power of
unions or afflict the balance of union and employer negotiating power Congress left
unrestricted when it passed the NLRA are invalid). To determine if a law or
regulation is preempted by the NLRA, courts must weigh and consider Board
expressions, either through adjudication or rulemaking, of the question at issue. See
id. at 363 (noting that Supreme Court precedent looks to the treatment and
regulation of activities that the NLRB controls to determine if a law or regulation
conflicts with the Act and adversely modifies labor rights (citing Wis. Dep’t of Indus.,
475 U.S. at 286; San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244
(1959))). Applying those analytical frameworks to the case at bar, the D.C. Circuit
concluded that, based on the Board’s treatment of Beck notices in its adjudication,
the Beck notice did not contravene the NLRA pursuant to the Board’s treatment of
Beck notices through adjudication. See id. at 363–64 (analyzing cases in which the
NLRB determined that employer silence as to Beck rights does not violate the Act,
and concluding that the Board’s treatment of employer silence did not create a
protected activity but instead recognized a permissible action (citing Rochester Mfg.
Co., 323 N.L.R.B. 260 (1997))).
132. Id. at 362 (highlighting that the President’s Executive Order requires
contractors to post notices informing employees of their rights under the array of
Supreme Court cases addressing nonmember fee expenditures, including the Beck
decision (citing Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 754–63 (1988))).
133. Id. at 363 (concluding that the Board’s interpretations of the NLRA and Beck
do not preempt a requirement that workplace actors post notices).
134. Id. at 365 (reasoning that section 8(c) does not provide a right to silence
under the NLRA).
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obligated to post Beck notices until the next administration moved
to modify the law.
c. President Barack Obama’s direct support for a notice-posting
requirement that provides broad information of rights under the NLRA—
Executive Order 13,496
Signaling support for a notice-posting requirement containing a
broader discussion of rights under the NLRA, President Obama
issued Executive Order 13,496 shortly after taking office.135 The
order revoked the narrow Beck notice provisions of Executive Order
13,201, and instead required government contractors to post notices in
the workplace informing employees of their rights under the NLRA.136
The prescribed notice provision details general information about
employee rights and “the obligations of employers and unions under
the NLRA.”137
The substance of this notice-posting requirement reflected many of
the concerns originally raised by Professor Morris when he requested
that the NLRB expand its proposed Beck notice-requirement to cover
all rights under the NLRA.138 The poster must provide information
in three categories: rights under the NLRA, illegal actions of
employers, and illegal actions of unions.139 Opponents criticized the
expanded message, pointing to the diminishment of the Beck notice
provision in the poster.140 Like all preceding Executive Orders, the
compelled notice-posting requirement only applied to federal
government contractors.141
3.

NLRB efforts to promulgate 29 C.F.R. Part 104
Persuaded by Executive Order 13,496 and the pro-union agenda of
the Obama administration, the Board ended the nearly twenty-year
pendency of Professor Morris’s request when it moved to promulgate
135. See Exec. Order No. 13,496, 3 C.F.R. 214, 214–15 (2010) (issued Jan. 30, 2009)
(repealing Exec. Order No. 13,201 and requiring that federal contractors post notices
in the workplace and failure to do so could result in termination or suspension of the
contract); see also 29 C.F.R. § 471.1–471.23 (2013) (codifying the President’s Executive
Order and providing the substance and form of the notice poster).
136. 75 Fed. Reg. 28,368 (May 20, 2010) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 471).
137. 29 C.F.R. pt. 471 app. A.
138. See infra notes 150–66 and accompanying text.
139. 29 C.F.R. pt. 471 app. A.
140. See 75 Fed. Reg. at 28,375 (“All nine comments about the right to refrain
from engaging in union activity universally criticized its lack of prominence, two of
these comments asserting that the provision’s prominence was so diminished that
they did not notice the statement at all.”); see also 29 C.F.R. pt. 471 app. A (providing
that nonmembers can “[c]hoose not to [engage in] any of these [union] activities,
including joining or remaining a member of a union”).
141. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 471 app. A.

AMODEO.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

4/2/2014 2:24 PM

812

[Vol. 63:789

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

a broad notice-posting requirement in late 2010.142 In December of
2010, the Board published a notice of proposed rulemaking outlining
its vision for notice-posting requirements.143 The NLRB originally set
the notice and comment period for sixty days, but then allowed all
comments submitted by March 23, 2011, to come in to the record.144
Soon after the NLRB issued its notice of proposed rulemaking, a
swath of individuals, trade associations, and business industries voiced
strong opposition to the rule.145 These opponents advanced a variety
of arguments against requiring notices in the workplace under the
NLRA.146
The most prominent argument posited against the
proposed regulation was that the NLRB lacked substantive
rulemaking authority under section 6 of the Act and that the notice

142. See Proposed Rules Governing Notification of Employee Rights Under the
National Labor Relations Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 80,411 (proposed Dec. 22, 2010) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 104) (recounting the arguments advanced by private
citizens, governors, and the President for over two and a half decades which
eventually moved the Board to promulgate the rule); see also Stephen Dinan, Obama
Moves To Reverse Bush Labor Union Policies, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2009),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jan/31/obama-moves-to-reverse-bush-labor
-union-policies/?page=all (“After eight years in a Washington-style exile, leaders of
labor unions were brought into the White House on Friday and treated to a series of
executive orders signed by President Obama that will curb union-busting and
preserve workers’ jobs on federal contracts.”).
143. See 75 Fed. Reg. at 80,411.
144. See Notification of Employee Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act,
76 Fed. Reg. 54,006, 54,007 (Aug. 30, 2011) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 104) (noting
the large influx of comments relating to the Board’s effort to promulgate a noticeposting regulation).
145. See id. (“In all, 7,034 comments were received from employers, employees,
unions, employer organizations, worker assistance organizations, and other
concerned organizations and individuals, including two members of Congress. The
majority of comments, as well as Board Member Hayes’s dissent, oppose the rule or
aspects of it . . . .”). Many of these comments derived from an organized opposition
campaign, as evidenced by an identical form message submitted by several
commenters. See, e.g., Comment from Glenda Morgan to NLRB regarding FR Doc.
No. 2010-32019 (Jan. 26, 2011), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail
;D=NLRB-2010-0011-1115; Comment from Blake Hermel to NLRB regarding FR Doc.
No. 2010-32019 (Feb. 15, 2011), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail
;D=NLRB-2010-0011-3971; Comment from Megan Beck to NLRB regarding FR Doc.
No. 2010-32019 (Feb. 15, 2011), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!document
Detail;D=NLRB-2010-0011-2694; Comment from Paul Weininger to NLRB regarding FR
Doc. No. 2010-32019 (Jan. 26, 2011), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!document
Detail;D=NLRB-2010-0011-1463; Comment from Phyllis Stromberg to NLRB regarding
Doc. No. 2010-32019 (Feb. 23, 2011), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!document
Detail;D=NLRB-2010-0011-5372.
146. See, e.g., 76 Fed. Reg. at 54,008 (reviewing comments submitted in opposition
to the rule that contend the NLRB lacks legal authority to promulgate such a
regulation); id. at 54,011 (discussing the comments submitted in opposition to the
regulation that adopt Member Hayes’s dissent as their justification for opposition);
id. at 54,012 (discussing comments submitted in opposition to the regulation that
highlight First Amendment concerns over the compulsory message and the
treatment of noncompliance).
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requirement contravened other protections afforded by the NLRA.147
The bulk of the comments supporting the NLRB’s regulatory
efforts came from unions, employee interest groups, and private
citizens.148 Ultimately, the NLRB rejected many of the criticisms
levied against the regulation and proceeded to promulgate the
notice-posting requirement.149
D. The NLRB’s Notice-Posting Regulation: An Overview
To understand the issues raised in conjunction with the NLRB’s
notice-posting requirement, it is important to examine the rule and
its functions. The regulation is broken into subparts.150 Subpart A
covers the definitional standards of the regulation,151 the required
notice,152 and exceptions to the regulation.153 Subpart B covers the

147. See id. at 54,008–10 (addressing the Board’s authority to promulgate
substantive rules under section 6 of the NLRA (citing Mourning v. Family Publ’ns.
Servs., 411 U.S. 356 (1973))); id. at 54,010–11 (analyzing the interstitial matter of a
notice-posting requirement and the recognized implied right of workers to receive
information under the act (citing Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 554 U.S. 60, 68
(2008); Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 531–32 (1992); Harlan Fuel Co., 8
N.L.R.B. 25, 32 (1938))); id. at 54,011–12 (responding to arguments that sections 8,
9, and 10 preempt the substance of the rule and noting that the poster seeks to
further those provisions by providing notice of those rights).
148. See, e.g., Comment from Pamela Dorsey, United Steelworkers Pharmacy Benefit
Call Ctr., to NLRB regarding FR Doc. No. 2010-32019 (Feb. 23, 2011), available at,
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=NLRB-2010-0011-5722 (positing that
the notice requirements would be beneficial to clarify misunderstandings and to help
keep employees informed of their rights); Comment from Danielle Feris, Hand in
Hand: The Domestic Employ’rs Ass’n, to NLRB regarding FR Doc. No. 2010-32019
(Feb. 23, 2013), available at, http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=NLRB2010-0011-5930 (supporting the notice-posting rule as a measure that contributes to
the mission of bettering standards in workplace); Comment from Aquilina Versoza,
Philipino Workers Ctr., to NLRB regarding FR Doc. No. 2010-32019 (Feb. 23, 2011),
available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=NLRB-2010-0011-6046
(remarking that the proposed notice can help to “improve[] workplace conditions”
for workers unaware of their substantive rights); cf. Comment from Tracy Tunwall,
IASHRA, to NLRB regarding FR Doc. No. 2010-32019 (Feb. 23, 2011), available at
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=NLRB-2010-0011-5658 (noting support
for the Board’s poster but urging the Board to post “complete and not selective or one
sided” information regarding rights to unionize or decertify a union under the NLRA).
149. 76 Fed. Reg. at 54,007 (“After careful consideration of the comments
received, the Board has decided to issue a final rule . . . .”).
150. See Obligations of Federal Contractors and Subcontractors; Notification of
Employee Rights Under Federal Labor Law, 29 C.F.R. §§ 104.201–104.204 (2013)
(Subpart A, the notice-posting requirement); id. §§ 104.210–104.214 (Subpart B,
General Enforcement and Complaint Procedures); id. § 104.220 (Subpart C, which
does not provide any regulatory functions but merely seeks to preserve and incorporate
other employment law provisions beyond the four corners of the regulation).
151. Id. § 104.201.
152. Id. § 104.202.
153. Id. § 104.210 (“[T]he Board will determine whether an employer is in
compliance when a person files an unfair labor practice charge alleging that the
employer has failed to post the employee notice required under this part. Filing a
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mechanisms for enforcement of noncompliance,154 and equitable
remedies available to aggrieved employees in instances where
noncompliance may have impacted their substantive rights.155
Part A is best summarized as the notice-posting rule, requiring that
employers display an eleven-by-seventeen inch poster containing a
specific message drafted by the NLRB.156 The poster expressly
touches upon three categorical areas: (1) the rights of employees to
unionize, collectively bargain, discuss compensation, and strike; (2)
the illegality of employers prohibiting discussion of union
organization, questioning union support, retaliating against union
association, and promising benefits to discourage union support; and
(3) the illegality of unions threatening or coercing employees to join
a union, to discriminate in making jobs referrals, causing an
employer to discriminate against a union member, or taking adverse
actions against employees because they have not joined a union.157
Notably, the notice poster does not contain any express discussion of
Beck rights because the NLRB concluded that unions generally
adhered to the Beck decision.158 Printable copies of the poster are
available online,159 or alternatively, an employer can request copies
from the closest regional NLRB office.160
Part B of the regulation provides the NLRB’s means of enforcing
the notice-posting requirement set forth in Part A. As a matter of
jurisdiction, the NLRB does not have the power to initiate
investigations.161 Accordingly, Part B restates the NLRB’s limitations
and ability to enforce the regulation only in instances where an
employee files a ULP charge with the Board.162 The regulation first
charge sets in motion the Board’s procedures for investigating and adjudicating
alleged unfair labor practices . . . .”).
154. Id. § 104.213.
155. Id. § 104.214.
156. See id. § 104.202 (detailing the notification requirement, the size of the
notice, and the requirements governing the location of the poster at the business);
see also Employee Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act, supra note 5 (providing an
example of the notice poster)
157. Employee Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act, supra note 5.
158. Notification of Employee Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act,
76 Fed. Reg. 54,006, 54,023 (Aug. 30 2011) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 104) (finding
unnecessary the inclusion of Beck rights in the Board’s notice poster because
unions are already required to inform employees of their Beck rights, unions
comply with Beck notice requirements, and Beck does not apply to the majority of
private sector employees).
159. 29 C.F.R. § 104.202(e).
160. Id.
161. See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text.
162. See 29 C.F.R. § 104.210 (asserting that the Board’s only enforcement
mechanism against a noncompliant employer is an employee’s initial charge against
their employer for failure to post the notice).
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provides an informal means of addressing a violation through
discussions between NLRB officials and the employer to ensure full
knowledge and compliance with the notice-posting rule.163 Should
this effort fail, the regulation provides injunctive remedies.164 The
NLRB may order the employer to post the notice in the workplace
along with an additional poster containing a message that notifies
employees of the prior non-compliance.165 Further, the NLRB may
treat failure to post “as evidence of unlawful motive” if there is a
finding of “a knowing and willful refusal to comply.”166
E. Legal Challenges to the Board’s Regulation
1.

Controversy at the NLRB regarding the notice-posting rule
The Board’s internal consideration of the rule was not without
controversy. Board member Brian Hayes, a Republican appointed to
the NLRB in 2009 by President Obama,167 dissented in the Board’s
notice of proposed rulemaking.168 Hayes’s dissent rejected NLRB
163. 29 C.F.R. § 104.212(a).
164. Id. § 104.212 (providing that the Board can bring a ULP charge against
violators); id. § 104.213 (listing remedies to cure a failure to post); id. § 105.214
(permitting the tolling of the NLRA’s statute of limitations for other ULP charges if
the employer has failed to post the notice).
165. Id. § 104.213 (stating that the Board will order a noncompliant employer “to
cease and desist from the unlawful conduct and post the required employee notice,
as well as a remedial notice”). The NLRB has customarily relied upon remedial
postings in adjudication proceedings to notify workers of an employer’s specific
violations of the NLRA. This injunctive remedy usually requires the posting of
conspicuous notices that provide information and admission of the NLRB’s final
judgment. See NLRB v. Express Publ’g Co., 312 U.S. 426, 438 (1941) (recognizing
that courts have held that section 10(c) of the NLRA authorizes employers to post
“notices advising the employees of the Board’s order and announcing the readiness
of the employer to obey” (citing NLRB v. Penn. Greyhound Lines, 303 U.S. 261, 268
(1938))); see also, e.g., Gem Mgmt. Co., 339 N.L.R.B. 489, 490 (2003) (providing an
example copy of a notice poster required by the NLRB pursuant to a judgment and
final order finding the commission of a ULP).
166. 29 C.F.R. § 104.214(b).
167. Press Release, White House, President Obama Announces Intent to
Nominate Brian Hayes as NLRB Member (July 9, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/president-obama-announces-intentnominate-brian-hayes-nlrb-member. As a member of the NLRB, Hayes ardently
contributed to the polarizing and politicized debate surrounding the Board, at one
point threatening to intentionally resign from the Board to prevent the agency from
operating with a quorum. See Steve Greenhouse, Republican Might Quit Labor Board, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 23, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/23/business/brian-e-hayesthreatens-to-quit-labor-board.html?pagewanted=all (detailing the partisan divide within
the Board and Brian Hayes’s threat to quit the Board to “deny the [Board] the threeperson quorum it needs to make any decisions”).
168. See Proposed Rules Governing Notification of Employee Rights Under the
National Labor Relations Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 80,410, 80,415 (proposed Dec. 22, 2010)
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 104) (providing Hayes’s rationale for opposing the
rule and his call for comments supporting his position that the NLRA does not
confer authority to promulgate a notice-posting requirement).
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arguments that the Board possesses the power to promulgate a
notice-posting regulation pursuant to the limiting remedial powers
contained under section 10 of the NLRA.169 Hayes argued that the
NLRA differs from other statutes containing notice-posting
requirements, and that the “absence of such express language in our
Act is a strong indicator, if not dispositive, that the Board lacks the
authority to impose such a requirement.”170 Though Hayes was alone
in his sentiments at the NLRB, his dissent later provided support and
guidance to groups opposing the rule through litigation.171
2.

Litigation challenging the notice-posting rule
Upon enactment, four trade associations filed suit against the
NLRB seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to invalidate the
notice-posting regulation.172
The National Association of
Manufacturers, the National Right to Work Legal Defense and
Education Foundation, the Coalition for a Democratic Workplace,
and the Chamber of Commerce (“the Chamber”) brought actions
against the NLRB in district courts.173 Shortly after filing, the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia consolidated the many
suits brought against the Board’s regulation.174 The Chamber suit
proceeded separately in the U.S. District Court for the District of
South Carolina.175
The opinions of the district courts split on the validity of the
notice-posting requirement. The D.C. District Court upheld the

169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See Corrected Brief of Appellees at 19, Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, 721
F.3d 152 (4th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-1757) (pointing to Hayes’s argument that section 10
of the NLRA restricts the Board to a purely reactive role in adjudicating ULP charges
(citing Notification of Employee Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act, 76
Fed. Reg., 54,006, 54,039 (Aug. 30, 2011) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 104))); see also
Chamber of Commerce, 721 F.3d at 155 (holding that the NLRA confers rulemaking
authority for the Board to carry out its statutorily defined reactive roles in addressing
ULP charges and union elections only).
172. Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, 856 F. Supp. 2d 778 (D.S.C. 2012), aff’d,
721 F.3d 152; Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 846 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 2012), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 717 F.3d 947 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
173. See generally Chamber of Commerce, 856 F. Supp. 2d 778; Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs.,
846 F. Supp. 2d 34. Uniquely, the NLRA does not contain a judicial review
provision to establish the more customary circuit court jurisdiction over
rulemaking challenges. See Lubbers, supra note 35, at 427–28 (finding that NLRB
rulemaking falls within the ACUS’s criteria for circuit court review). Without a
judicial review provision, opponents to Board regulations can more easily engage
in “district court forum shopping and two-level review in challenges to virtually all
significant Board rules.” Id. at 428.
174. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 846 F. Supp. 2d at 38, 41.
175. See Chamber of Commerce, 856 F. Supp. 2d at 778.
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posting requirement,176 but struck down the regulation’s
enforcement mechanisms on grounds that they violated
congressional intent.177 Conversely, the South Carolina District Court
struck the entire rule on grounds that Congress never granted the
NLRB the authority to promulgate a notice-posting requirement.178
The NLRB appealed both actions, and for a brief time experts
believed the controversy would remain split amongst the two
circuits.179 However, such predictions were short-lived.180
a.

The D.C. Circuit’s opinion

The D.C. Circuit reversed the district court’s holding and concluded
that the regulation violated provisions of the NLRA.181 Declining to
adopt its previous standard in UAW-Labor Employment & Training
Corp.,182 the D.C. Circuit held that compulsory notice postings are in
conflict with the NLRA’s protection of non-coercive speech.183 The Act
provides that the NLRB has no authority to regulate noncoercive
speech that takes an adverse opinion to unionization.184
Judge Randolph, writing for the court, sought to distinguish his
opinion from the UAW holding by highlighting the absence of NLRB
176. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 846 F. Supp. 2d at 48 (upholding the rule on grounds
that Congress did not intend to prevent the Board from promulgating a noticeposting requirement).
177. Id. at 52–54 (reasoning that failure to post the notice does not fall under 29
U.S.C. § 158’s provision which makes it an unfair labor practice to “interfere with,
restrain, or coerce” an employee’s rights); id. at 55–56 (holding that the NLRA does
not permit the Board to promulgate a rule that materially affects the statute of
limitations under the Act); id. at 61–63 (finding that the regulation’s posting
requirements are severable from the invalidated enforcement mechanisms).
178. See Chamber of Commerce, 856 F. Supp. 2d at 789–97 (examining the plain
language, structure, and legislative history of the NLRA and comparing the NLRA to
other relevant labor statutes to determine that the Board does not have the authority
to issue the notice-posting rule).
179. Abigail Rubenstein, NLRB Appeal Could Split Circuits on Union Poster Rule,
LAW360.COM (June 15, 2012), http://www.law360.com/articles/350594/nlrb-appeal-could
-split-circuits-on-union-poster-rule.
180. See Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, 721 F.3d 152, 160–67 (4th Cir. 2013)
(affirming the district court’s invalidation of the notice-posting regulation); Nat’l
Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 717 F.3d 947, 963–64 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (reversing the district
court’s decision finding the notice-posting requirement valid).
181. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 717 F.3d at 958–59 (concluding that the rule violates
section 8(c) of the Act).
182. See supra notes 119–34 and accompanying text (discussing the D.C. Circuit’s
standard in UAW-Labor Emp. & Training Corp. which upheld a Beck notice-posting
requirement promulgated pursuant to Executive Order 13,201).
183. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 717 F.3d at 958–59 (acknowledging the UAW decision
and declining to adopt its holding on adverse grounds (citing UAW-Labor Emp’t &
Training Corp. v. Chao, 325 F.3d 360 (D.C. Cir. 2003))).
184. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2012) (providing that viewpoints which contain “no
threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit” are permissible in the workplace
and cannot be treated as a ULP under the NLRA).

AMODEO.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

4/2/2014 2:24 PM

818

[Vol. 63:789

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

enforcement mechanisms in Executive Order 13,201.185
The
enforcement provisions contained in the Board’s challenged
regulation specifically treated noncompliance as a potential ULP,
classifying an employer’s knowing and willful defiance to post as
“evidence of anti-union animus.”186 Analyzing the regulation’s
enforcement mechanisms against section 8(c) of the NLRA, Judge
Randolph concluded that the regulation’s treatment of willful
noncompliance violated the protected anti-union viewpoint of an
employer.187 Though the D.C. Circuit’s opinion did not reach the
merits of the NLRB’s authority to promulgate a notice-posting rule
under section 6 of the NLRA, Judge Henderson and Judge Brown
filed a concurring opinion stating that the Act does not authorize a
“prophylactic” rule like the disputed notice-posting regulation.188
b.

The Fourth Circuit’s opinion

Conversely, the Fourth Circuit avoided the issue of employer
speech rights and instead focused on limitations the NLRA poses to
rulemaking and requiring notice under the statute.189 To determine
if the regulation was permissible, the court analyzed the statute’s
language and the legislative context behind the Board’s structure,
functions, and rulemaking power.190 Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit
rejected the argument that the NLRB’s reactive investigatory role
necessitates a notice-posting requirement to inform employees of
their rights, and instead held that the NLRA does not provide the

185. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 717 F.3d at 958 (asserting that “there was no prospect
of a contractor’s being charged with an unfair labor practice for failing to post the
required notice” because the Board was not involved with administering the order).
186. Id. at 955 (quoting Notification of Employee Rights Under the National
Labor Relations Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 54,006, 54,035–36 (Aug. 30, 2011) (codified at 29
C.F.R. pt. 104)).
187. Id. at 959 (concluding that the treatment of failure to post as evidence of
anti-union sentiment violates NLRA protections that allow parties to express noncoercive messages). But see id. at 959 n.19 (explaining that NLRB regulations
requiring employers to post election notices do not violate the First Amendment or
the NLRA because they do not treat failure to post as evidence of anti-union
sentiment).
188. Id. at 967 (Henderson, J., concurring) (finding that the NLRA does not
require the Board to “educate its employees on the fine points of labor relations law”
because Congress delineated the specific, remedial means through which the Board
could enforce its policies).
189. See Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, 721 F.3d 152, 160–61 (4th Cir. 2013)
(maintaining that the Board’s authority to promulgate a notice-posting rule must
derive from some implicit or explicit portion of the statute, and finding no such
evident authority).
190. See id. at 162 (asserting that the circuit court should review the provision in
the context of other statutory language (citing FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529 U.S. 133, 132 (2000))).
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Board with the authority to affirmatively act absent a ULP claim
triggering the Board’s jurisdiction.191
Further, the Fourth Circuit assessed the landscape of legislative
history behind the formation of the NLRA to conclude that Congress
never intended to authorize, or, alternatively, leave a gap for the
NLRB to authorize, a notice-posting requirement.192 To aid in its
assessment, the Fourth Circuit examined the deliberations of
Congress in amending the Railway Labor Act, an analogous laborrelated administrative statute covering the railway and airline
industries, enacted at the same time as the NLRA.193 Acknowledging
that Congress inserted notice provisions in the Railway Labor Act and
omitted those provisions in the NLRA, the Fourth Circuit concluded
that the drafters of the NLRA never intended to create compulsory
notice-postings under the Act.194 Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit
joined the D.C. Circuit in striking the rule, and rested its judgment
on grounds that the Board did not possess congressionally delegated
authority to promulgate a notice-posting regulation.195
II. THE BOARD’S NOTICE-POSTING REQUIREMENT PROPERLY SERVES
TO ADAPT THE NLRA TO THE CHANGING PATTERNS OF INDUSTRY
As the agency tasked with enforcing and interpreting the NLRA,
the Board is entrusted with adapting applications of the Act to the
evolving workplace.196 The D.C. and Fourth Circuit decisions
unmistakably challenge the Board’s ability to fulfill its duty through
rulemaking.197 Both decisions held that the Board retains a purely
191. See id. at 162–63 (analyzing sections 6 through 10 of the NLRA and
concluding that the Board may not derive any power from those respective sections
to promulgate the disputed notice-posting regulation).
192. See id. at 164–66 (analyzing the history of the NLRA and subsequent
amendments to the Act to conclude that “Congress’s continued exclusion of a
notice-posting requirement from the NLRA” is sufficiently dispositive of the NLRA’s
authority to promulgate such a rule).
193. Id. at 157 n.4, 165 (observing that other federal labor statutes contain explicit
employment notice provisions).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 166–67.
196. See NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266 (1975) (delineating the
Board’s role as the entrusted interpreter of the Act to ensure compliance through
evolving industry practices).
197. See Chamber of Commerce, 721 F.3d at 161 (“[T]he substantive provisions of the
Act make clear that the Board is a reactive entity, and thus do not imply that Congress
intended to allow proactive rulemaking of the sort challenged here through the general
rulemaking provision of section 6.” (emphasis added)); Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB,
717 F.3d 947, 967 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Henderson, J., concurring) (“In sum, given the
Act’s language and structure are manifestly remedial, I do not believe the Congress
intended to authorize a regulation so aggressively prophylactic as the posting rule.”
(emphasis added)).
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reactive role in all matters and limited the NLRB’s power to
promulgate regulations that create affirmative duties outside of
If these two decisions are not
adjudicatory investigations.198
reexamined, the NLRB’s ability to promulgate substantive regulations
will face substantial challenges.
Though untested for years, the Board has retained substantive
rulemaking powers to aid its mission of protecting and encouraging
labor organization.199 This rulemaking power necessarily serves to
provide clarity and guidance to industry by requiring affirmative
duties that seek to mitigate labor strife and the need for adjudication
of unfair labor practices.200 In reassessing the rulemaking powers of
the NLRB, the progeny of Beck requirements and the AHA decision
provide support for the Board’s power to affirmatively require notice
to workers.201 Moreover, the notice poster connects the Board’s voice
to the discourse of workplace labor discussions and offers a strictly
factual and permissible restatement of the law.202
A. NLRB Authority To Promulgate Notice-Posting Requirements
The litigation challenging the NLRB’s notice regulation presents a
new iteration of issues previously explored in challenged Beck noticeposting requirements: whether such notices are preempted by a
limitation of power under the NLRA.203 The NLRA does not contain
a notice-posting provision, leaving open a theoretical question of
198. See Chamber of Commerce, 721 F.3d at 161; Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 717 F.3d at 967
(Henderson, J., concurring).
199. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012) (providing that the Board shall “encourag[e]
the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the
exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of their own choosing”); id. § 156 (providing the
Board’s rulemaking powers to carry out the policy aims of the Act); see also Am.
Hosp. Ass’n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 612 (1991) (affirming the NLRB’s power to
promulgate substantive regulations that control matters outside of individualized
and remedial adjudications).
200. Am. Hosp. Ass’n., 499 U.S. at 613 (upholding a regulation promulgated by the
Board that defines substantive bargaining unit classifications “in advance” of
potential future controversies, thus mitigating disputes between health care unions
and medical employers).
201. Id. at 614 (holding that the Board has authority to promulgate substantive
rules); Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 758–59 (1988) (holding that
unions may not assess agency fees for non-administrative expenditures, a ruling that
impliedly required some form of notice to nonmembers of their rights); Cal. Saw &
Knife Works, 320 N.L.R.B. 224, 233 (1995) (extending the Beck decision to require
unions to provide notice of rights under section 8 of the NLRA to nonmembers
incurring agency fee charges under union security agreements).
202. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 464 (2009) (holding that
government speech is “not subject to scrutiny”).
203. See supra notes 126–29 and accompanying text (describing the unions’ two
main arguments against Beck notice posters, both rooted in the NLRA’s preemption
of laws that conflict with Board interpretations of the NLRA).
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whether the absence of a congressionally mandated poster creates a
statutory interstice.204 Three sources provide guidance in assessing
the Board’s ability to promulgate a notice-posting regulation: the
legal precedent addressing NLRB rulemaking authority,205 the
express language of the statute,206 and the expressions and intentions
of Congress when it enacted the NLRA.207
Beck and AHA as a framework for a notice-posting requirement under
the NLRA
Despite the inconsistent history of Beck notice-posting
requirements,208 the Supreme Court’s decision in Beck, when
conflated with AHA, provides justification and authority for the
Board’s prophylactic notice-posting regulation.209 Remarkably, the
decisions of the D.C. Circuit and the Fourth Circuit failed to analyze
the Beck case and subsequent Board requirements for union notice to
nonmembers.210 Beck and its progeny substantiate the proposition

1.

204. See Notification of Employee Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act,
76 Fed. Reg. 54,006, 54,006–07 (Aug. 30, 2011) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 104) (“The
Board is almost unique among agencies and departments administering major
Federal labor and employment laws in not requiring employers routinely to post
notices at their workplaces informing employees of their statutory rights.”).
205. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 499 U.S. at 613 (recognizing the Board’s power to
promulgate rules “in advance” of future legal disputes).
206. See 29 U.S.C. § 156 (2012) (providing the Board with the power to
promulgate rules necessary to carry out the other provisions of the act); see also id.
§ 151 (delineating the policy aims of the NLRA).
207. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1875 (2013) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (providing that an “agency is due no deference, [if] Congress has left no
gap for the agency to fill” (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984))); see also id. at 1876 (finding that courts can
examine statutory language, context, and structure as well as canons of textual
construction to determine if a statute’s “ambiguity comes accompanied with agency
authority to fill a gap”).
208. See supra Part I.C.1, C.2.b. (recounting the Board’s reluctance to issue
regulations codifying Beck and the controversy involving President George W. Bush’s
efforts to reignite codification of Beck notice requirements in the workplace).
209. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 499 U.S. at 612 (holding that the Board has the power to
resolve “certain issues of general applicability” through rulemaking); Commc’ns
Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 758–59 (1988) (establishing the right of
nonmembers to restrict agency fee expenditures to representative matters only); see
also Cal. Saw & Knife Works, 320 N.L.R.B. 224, 252 (1995) (“Unions are obligated
under their duty of fair representation to provide notice of Beck rights to all
nonmember employees.”).
210. The Fourth Circuit did not reference the Beck case or the Board’s adjudicated
notice-posting standard in California Saw. See generally Chamber of Commerce v.
NLRB, 721 F.3d 152 (4th Cir. 2013). The D.C. Circuit makes only scant references to
the California Saw case, dismissing its applicability in a brief footnote. See Nat’l Ass’n
of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 717 F.3d 947, 959 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“[N]o one—and certainly
not the Board—has even suggested that the posting rule was needed because
employers are misleading employees about their rights under the National Labor
Relations Act.” (citing Rochester Mfg. Co., 323 N.L.R.B. 260 (1997); Cal. Saw, 320
N.L.R.B. 224)). But see Notification of Employee Rights Under the National Labor
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that notice-requirements permissibly serve to clarify ambiguities
within the NLRA.211
Concerned with potential violations of section 8(a)(3) of the
NLRA, which provides unions with the power to charge nonmembers
specifically for benefits they receive under collective bargaining
agreements, the Beck Court restricted unions to “the collection of
only those fees necessary to finance collective-bargaining activities.”212
Anticipating an onslaught of litigation pursuant to this ruling, the
NLRB drafted compliance guidelines to help mitigate future issues—
including the need for unions to provide notice of rights and
expenditures to nonmembers.213 Although the NLRB never fully
promulgated a Beck notice requirement, such a requirement would
likely be justified pursuant to the Court’s holding in AHA.214
The AHA decision acknowledged that the Board “has the authority
to rely on rulemaking to resolve certain issues of general applicability
unless Congress clearly expresses an intent to withhold that
authority.”215 Intrinsic in this holding is the Board’s power to
proactively regulate matters outside of adjudication proceedings.216
The Board has recognized that interested parties have been pushing
it to develop policies that will lessen the individualized approach of
Relations Act, 76 Fed. Reg., 54,006, 54,017 (Aug. 30, 2011) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt.
104) (demonstrating misleading employer comments that workers may only join
“union companies” if they want to engage in a union environment).
211. See Cal. Saw, 320 N.L.R.B. at 252 (requiring unions to provide notice of Beck
rights to employees out of their duty of fair representation).
212. Beck, 487 U.S. at 759.
213. See supra notes 80–103 and accompanying text (describing the NLRB’s failed
attempt to implement the Beck decision through regulations establishing that unions
must inform nonmembers of the precise use of their agency fees).
214. See Union Dues Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 43,635, 43,635–36 (proposed Sept.
22, 1992) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 103) (justifying the need for affirmative
rulemaking pursuant to AHA); see also id. at 43,637 (identifying an inherent duty to
disclose certain fiduciary information to members and nonmembers to avoid a
breach of “section 7 rights of employees to refrain from concerted activities”).
215. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 612 (1991).
216. See 29 U.S.C. 160(b) (2012) (providing that the Board has the authority to
initiate adjudication proceedings only pursuant to a ULP charge with the Board);
Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 499 U.S. at 612 (“The requirement that the Board exercise its
discretion in every disputed case cannot fairly or logically be read to command the
Board to exercise standardless discretion in each case.”). Legislative history also
hints at the Boards authority to promulgate rules outside of the requirements under
section 10 of the NLRA, as indicated by a portion of a house report discussing the
expectation that the Board will promulgate rules governing procedure. See, e.g., H.R.
REP. NO. 74-972, at 21 (1935) (“It is contemplated, of course, that the Board will
establish rules governing procedure in greater detail, in such manner as will be
conducive to the proper dispatch of business and to the ends of justice.” (emphasis added)).
This language supports a rule providing notice to parties of what rights and
restrictions apply to them under the NLRA. See id. at 29 (stating that the Board may
“prescribe such rules and regulations as it deems necessary to carry out the
provisions of this resolution”).
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adjudicating common and repeated issues.217
The regulation
disputed in AHA specifically achieves this aim, and circumvents the
need for individualized adjudication to address bargaining unit
classifications in the health care industry.218 The regulation offers
eight classifications of health care bargaining units in anticipation of
future disputes.219
This type of rule, a proactive yet non-investigatory measure,
operates in full compliance with the NLRA’s legislative history which
indicates that the Board may not act in a “roving” manner to seek out
and initiate investigations.220 Accordingly, the AHA decision affirms
the Board’s authority to promulgate regulations that address, clarify,
and potentially mitigate legal issues in future controversies before they
reach the Board through adjudication.221 The Board’s effort to
promulgate a Beck notice requirement achieves the same effect and
seeks to provide clarity on the rights and restrictions that govern
nonmembers and unions.222
When conflated with Beck and California Saw, the AHA decision
establishes a basis for providing notice to workers of their rights
under the NLRA. The Beck decision highlights some of the
intricacies of labor law, noting that unions derive a right to collect
union-security dues but also must adhere to “the judicially created

217. See Collective-Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry, 52 Fed. Reg.
25,142, 25,144–45 (proposed July 2, 1987) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 103)
(noting that Congress sought to pass legislation requiring the NLRB to
promulgate regulations and the Seventh Circuit admonished the Board to
engage in more rulemaking).
218. See 29 C.F.R. § 103.30 (providing eight distinct classifications for bargaining
units that are the only “appropriate units” recognized in the health care industry
under the Act, absent any extraordinary circumstances).
219. Id.
220. The Fourth Circuit, in its review of this controversy, placed emphasis on the
legislative history of the NLRA and Congress’s express refusal to grant the Board
“roving” powers. See Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, 721 F.3d 152, 156, 164 (4th
Cir. 2013). The discussion of the NLRB’s lack of “roving” power specifically
addressed the Board’s jurisdictional authority to issue investigative subpoenas. See
H.R. REP. NO. 74-972, at 22 (stating that the subpoena power conferred under
section 11 of the act is restricted only to the reactive role of adjudicating claims and
overseeing elections); see also 29 U.S.C. § 160 (providing that the Board may only
initiate adjudication proceedings pursuant to ULP charges). This express restriction
does not speak to the Board’s rulemaking authority. See H.R. REP. NO. 74-972, at 22
(making no mention of, or restriction to, rulemaking powers).
221. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 499 U.S. at 612 (“[E]ven if a statutory scheme requires
individualized determinations, the decision-maker has the authority to rely on
rulemaking to resolve certain issues of general applicability . . . .”).
222. See Union Dues Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 43,635, 43,636–37 (proposed Sep.
22, 1992) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 103) (discussing the shifting standard of fair
representational duties and the need for notification of rights pursuant to that
shifting standard).
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duty of fair representation.”223 This common law duty is subject to
developing standards and interpretations of the NLRB and the
courts.224 Beck notices and the final rule examined in AHA provide
unions, employers, and employees with notice and guidance of the
Board’s interpretation of law.225 A more general notice-posting
requirement—aimed at providing knowledge of legal rights and
requirements governed by the Board’s decisions—is similarly and
properly focused to regulate matters “of general applicability.”226
2.

Finding the gap: The statutory absence of notice-posting requirements
under the NLRA
The NLRA’s silence as to notice-posting requirements, when
coupled with the Board’s authority to promulgate rules “necessary to
carry out”227 other provisions of the Act, creates a legislative gap.228 It
is well established that administrative agencies must receive deference
when promulgating rules within their substantive jurisdiction that are
not preempted by legislative intent or limiting principles set forth in
the agency’s statute.229 Congress’s legislative expressions that speak
directly to the matter being litigated also restrain a court’s
interpretation of the statute.230 Close examination of the NLRA’s
223. Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 742 (1988) (finding that
the lower court had jurisdiction to hear claims of whether exacting fees beyond those
necessary to finance collective bargaining violated fair representation).
224. See, e.g., id. at 745 (acknowledging that this case presents the first time that
the court examines the precise limits of section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA).
225. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 499 U.S. at 614 (deferring to the “Board’s reasonable
interpretation of the statutory text”); Cal. Saw & Knife Works, 320 N.L.R.B. 224, 233
(1995) (interpreting the NLRA to determine that “a union acts arbitrarily and in bad
faith—in breach of its duty of fair representation—when it fails to inform newly
hired nonmembers of their Beck rights at the time the union first seeks to obligate
these newly hired nonmember employees to pay dues”).
226. Cf. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 499 U.S. at 612 (upholding a rule limiting the type of
employee units appropriate for collective bargaining in acute care hospitals because
regulators may resolve issues of general applicability through rulemaking, absent an
express Congressional prohibition).
227. 29 U.S.C. § 156 (2012).
228. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1873 (2013) (prescribing that
courts must defer to an agency’s reading of ambiguities within its statute, even if the
reviewing court may not have arrived at the same conclusion if the controversy were
to have originated within its own jurisdiction).
229. Id. at 1874 (granting deference to the FCC “because Congress has
unambiguously vested the FCC with general authority to administer the
Communications Act through rulemaking and adjudication, and the agency
interpretation at issue was promulgated in the exercise of that authority”); see also
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)
(providing the well-known two-pronged standard of review under which courts must
review administrative decisions with deference).
230. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132–33, (2000)
(stating that lower courts must review a statute in its full context while also looking to
other expressions of Congress that address the considerations the regulating agency
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structure, as well as the legislative history of the Act, provides
insufficient support that Congress was against notice-posting
requirements under the NLRA.231
a.

NLRA provisions support the Board’s authority to promulgate a
notice requirement

Nothing in the NLRA serves to limit the Board’s authority to
promulgate a notice-posting requirement.232 Section 6 of the NLRA
confers proactive rulemaking authority, as acknowledged by the
Supreme Court’s decision in AHA.233 This section plainly states that
the Board shall have authority to promulgate “rules and regulations
as may be necessary to carry out the provisions” of the NLRA.234
Accordingly, the Board cannot promulgate regulations that expand
beyond the scope of the statute; it must provide justification for a
rule’s necessity in aiding with the administration of another section
within the statute.235
Beck notice provisions offer a good example of this principle. The
Beck decision was the first time the Supreme Court “delineated the
precise limits section 8(a)(3) places on the negotiation and
enforcement of union-security agreements.”236 A Beck notice serves to
carry out section 8(a)(3) by providing guidance regarding the
statute’s treatment of union-security agreements and the rights of

seeks to confront); cf. City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1874 (responding to the dissent
by arguing that rulemaking should not be subject to de novo determinations of
whether Congress expressly delegated authority for a particular issue that is within
the purview of an administrative agency’s substantive field).
231. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 499 U.S. at 613 (“As a matter of statutory drafting, if
Congress had intended to curtail in a particular area the broad rulemaking authority
granted in § 6, we would have expected it to do so in language expressly describing
an exception from that section or at least referring specifically to the section.”); see
also Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 846 F. Supp. 2d 34, 48 (D.D.C. 2012) (“[T]he Court
cannot find that in enacting the NLRA, Congress unambiguously intended to
preclude the Board from promulgating a rule that requires employers to post a
notice informing employees of their rights under the Act. Neither the text of the
statute nor any binding precedent supports plaintiffs’ narrow reading of a broad,
express grant of rulemaking authority.”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 717 F.3d 947 (D.C.
Cir. 2013).
232. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 846 F. Supp. 2d at 47–48 (noting that limitations cited
by opponents only address “limits on the Board’s authority . . . once a violation has
been found” through adjudication, and concluding that Congress did not place a
limitation to preclude the Board from promulgating the challenged regulation).
233. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 499 U.S. at 612 (recognizing the Board’s substantive
rulemaking authority); see also 29 U.S.C. § 156 (2012) (providing the Board with the
power to make rules necessary to aid in its administration of other provisions under
the act).
234. 29 U.S.C. § 156 (emphasis added).
235. Id.
236. Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 745 (1988).

AMODEO.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

4/2/2014 2:24 PM

826

[Vol. 63:789

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

employees to object to agency fee expenditures.237 Such notice would
be proper under the NLRA because it derives from another provision
within the statute.238
Opponents of the Board’s broader notice-posting authority argue
that no provisions in the statute support the NLRB’s aim of generally
informing workers of their rights.239 Examining the full statute,
sections 1 and 7 of the NLRA provide justifications for a noticeposting requirement.240 Section 1 recognizes that employers have
historically denied employee efforts to collectively organize, and thus
provides in part:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate
the causes of certain substantial obstructions . . . by encouraging the
practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the
exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization,
and designation of representatives of their own choosing . . . .241

This section delineates the congressionally mandated policy that the
Board facilitate and encourage the exercise of concerted and
organized activities under the protections of the Act.242 To aid in
advancing this policy, Congress provided the Board with both
adjudicative and rulemaking powers.243 As a limiting principle,
Congress restricted the Board’s investigatory abilities under section
10 of the Act to a remedial role.244 However, this restriction does not

237. See NLRB GC 88-14 GUIDELINES, supra note 72, at *1 (“If a union has a unionsecurity clause covering statutory employees, and if it expends part of the funds
collected thereunder on non-representational activities, that union has an obligation
to notify nonmember employees: (1) that a stated percentage of funds was spent in
the last accounting year for non-representational activities; (2) that nonmembers can
object to having their union-security payments spent on such activities; and (3) that
those who object will be charged only for representational activities.”).
238. See Cal. Saw & Knife Works, 320 N.L.R.B. 224, 231 (1995) (dismissing the
need under section 8(b)(1)(A) for notice of Beck rights to nonmembers).
239. See Notification of Employee Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act,
76 Fed. Reg. 54,006, 54,011 (Aug. 30, 2011) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 104) (“Some
comments, such as those of the Council on Labor Law Equality (COLLE), contend
that the Board has no authority whatsoever to administer the NLRA unless a
representation petition or unfair labor practice charge has been filed under Sections
9 or 10, respectively.”).
240. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 846 F. Supp. 2d 34, 46 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding
no ground for differentiating the powers granted to the Board to carry out section 7
and the broad powers associated with other sections), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 717
F.3d 947 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
241. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012) (emphasis added).
242. Id.
243. See supra notes 14–50 and accompanying text.
244. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (delineating the policy to encourage employees to
exercise certain concerted practices and right); id. § 160(a)-(b) (providing that the
Board may “prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice . . .
[w]henever it is charged that any person has engaged or is engaging in any such
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encumber the Board’s rulemaking power under section 6, which
allows the Board to promulgate regulations that will mitigate and
clarify ambiguities that are “generally applicabl[e]” to labor
interactions and disputes.245
Further, section 7 of the NLRA also provides justification for the
Board’s notice-posting requirement.246 Section 7 delineates the rights
of employees to collectively bargain, engage in concerted activities,
join unions, or refrain from any of those activities.247 By conflating
the rights outlined in section 7 with the policy aims of section 1—
“encouraging the practice and procedure” of these rights—the
argument can be made that the Board possesses a reasonable basis
for promulgating a notice-posting requirement.248 As stated in the
NLRB’s policy justification for the final rule, the Board wanted “to
better enable the exercise of rights under the statute”—a basis that is
in line with the policy aims granted by Congress when it originally
enacted the NLRA in 1934.249
b.

Sister act: Constructing a gap in the NLRA through comparisons
with the Railway Labor Act

Notice-posting requirements contained in the NLRA’s sister act,
the Railway Labor Act (RLA), support the inference that Congress,
whether intentionally or unknowingly, created a legislative gap when
it omitted a notice-posting requirement in the NLRA.250 In support
of its decision invalidating the NLRB’s notice-posting regulation, the
Fourth Circuit compared the legislative histories of the NLRA and

unfair labor practice”); see also supra note 220 and accompanying text (emphasizing
the legislative intent that the Board’s authority not be “roving”).
245. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 609–10 (1991).
246. See Notification of Employee Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act, 76
Fed. Reg. 54,006 (Aug. 30, 2011) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 104) (discussing section 7
and acknowledging that employees must be aware of their rights to exercise them).
247. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
248. See 76 Fed. Reg. at 54,006 (providing the Board’s justification for
promulgating a rule under sections 6 and 7 of the NLRA).
249. See Proposed Rules Governing Notification of Employee Rights Under the
National Labor Relations Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 80,410 (Dec. 22, 2010) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. pt. 104) (emphasis added); see also 29 U.S.C. § 151 (providing that the policy aim
of the NLRA is to “encourage” the practices and rights afforded under the Act).
250. See Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, 721 F.3d 152, 157 & n.4 (4th Cir. 2013)
(observing that the NLRA is different from most labor bills for its lack of a notice
provision); see also City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874 (2013)
(expounding that administrative agencies cannot go beyond the boundaries set forth
by Congress, and if “Congress has established an ambiguous line, the agency can go
no further than the ambiguity will fairly allow”); Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 499 U.S. at 612–13
(validating the Board’s authority to promulgate regulations that apply to substantive
interstitial questions that arise within “the Act’s underlying policy, the goal of
facilitating the organization and recognition of unions”).
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the RLA.251 Scholars, practitioners, and courts regularly analogize the
RLA to the NLRA because they feature congruent statutory language
and similar purposes.252 Although the two statutes are alike in certain
ways, the agencies administering each statute are not identical.253
Moreover, the NLRA strips the Board of its power to regulate union
activities subject to the RLA’s jurisdiction over the railroad and
airline industries.254
Concurrent with its enactment of the NLRA, Congress also
amended the RLA.255 Included among those amendments were two
notice provisions, one requiring notice of contracts abrogated under
the amendments, and another requiring notice of dispute resolution
rights under the RLA.256 Conversely, Congress rejected a similar
proposed contract abrogation and notice provision in the NLRA.257
In passing landmark labor legislation, Congress sought to address
the problem of employment contracts that retroactively violate the
law by requiring abrogation of improper agreements.258 In an effort
to facilitate compliance with this measure, Congress inserted notice
provisions in both the RLA and the NLRA to compel disclosure of

251. See Chamber of Commerce, 721 F.3d at 164 (“We also find the history of the
NLRA instructive, particularly vis-a-vis congressional treatment of sister agencies with
statutory authorization to require the posting of notices.”).
252. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Indep. Fed’n of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S.
426, 432 (1989) (“We have observed in the past that carefully drawn analogies from
the federal common labor law developed under the NLRA may be helpful in
deciding cases under the RLA.” (citing Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394
U.S. 369, 377 (1969))); Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 751 (1988)
(analogizing the NLRA to the RLA); see also Baver, supra note 22, at 881 (comparing
the National Management Board that administers the RLA to the NLRB).
253. Rafael Gely, A Tale of Three Statutes . . . (and One Industry): A Case Study on the
Competitive Effects of Regulation, 80 OR. L. REV. 947, 955 (2001) (discussing the
mechanical differences between the National Mediation Board and the NLRB).
254. See 29 U.S.C. § 152 (providing that the NLRB’s jurisdiction “shall not
include . . . any person subject to the Railway Labor Act”).
255. See National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935);
Pub. L. No. 73-442, 48 Stat. 1185 (1934).
256. See Chamber of Commerce, 721 F.3d at 164–66 (discussing the various notice
provisions contained in the NLRA and the RLA legislation).
257. See Pub. L. No. 73-442, § 2 (Fifth), 48 Stat. at 1188 (containing the RLA’s
contract abrogation notice provision); S. 2926, 73d Cong. § 304(b) (as introduced in
Senate, Feb. 28, 1934) (providing that “[a]ny term of a contract or agreement of any
kind which conflicts with the provisions of this Act is hereby abrogated, and every
employer who is a party to such contract or agreement shall immediately so notify his
employees by appropriate action”), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 1, 14 (1949).
258. See Pub. L. No. 73-442, § 2 (Fifth), 48 Stat. at 1188 (abrogating contracts that
“require any person seeking employment to sign any contract or agreement
promising to join or not to join a labor organization”); S. 2926, 73d Cong. § 304(b)
(as introduced in Senate, Feb. 28, 1934) (abrogating contracts that violate any
provision in the NLRA), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT, supra note 257, at 1, 14.
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contract abrogation.259 Congress deleted the contract abrogation
provisions from the NLRA before it was enacted, thereby mooting the
necessity to provide notice of repealed employment contracts.260
Conversely, the RLA amendments passed with the contract
abrogation notice requirement intact.261 Additionally, Congress also
required notice to railway workers of their right to bring disputes
before the National Mediation Board under the RLA.262
Opponents of the Board’s notice-posting regulation seized upon
the absence and deletion of notice-requirements under the NLRA by
asserting that Congress was aware of the option to require noticepostings and affirmatively chose not to exercise that option.263 At first
blush, the conflicting expressions of notice requirements under the
RLA and NLRA might seem to negate a congressional delegation of
authority that would allow the Board to require affirmative noticepostings.264 However, to reach that conclusion courts must assess
whether Congress addressed the “precise question at issue” when it
deleted a notice-posting requirement from the NLRA.265
While the aims of these notice provisions seem aligned, Congress
viewed the substance and effect of each provision differently.
Looking only to the abrogation notice provision in the NLRA,
Congress grappled with the complicated and messy effect of
259. See Pub. L. No. 73-442, § 2 (Fifth), 48 Stat. at 1188 (RLA Amendments); S.
2926, 73d Cong. § 304(b) (as introduced in Senate, Feb. 28, 1934), reprinted in 1
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, supra note 257, at 1, 14.
260. See S. 2926, 73d Cong. at. 23 (reported May 10, 1934 with Amendments) (striking
section 304(b) from the bill and reintroducing new language), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, supra note 257, at 1084–85.
261. See 45 U.S.C. § 152 (Fifth) (providing notice of contracts abrogated under
the RLA).
262. See id. § 152 (Eighth) (“Every carrier shall notify its employees by printed
notices in such form and posted at such times and places as shall be specified by the
Mediation Board that all disputes between the carrier and its employees will be
handled in accordance with the requirements of this chapter, and in such notices there
shall be printed verbatim, in large type, the third, fourth, and fifth paragraphs of this
section. The provisions of said paragraphs are made a part of the contract of
employment between the carrier and each employee, and shall be held binding upon
the parties, regardless of any other express or implied agreements between them.”).
263. As support for this assertion, Amici submitted a detailed chart delineating the
timing and sequence of various amendments and deletions to both the RLA and
NLRA. See Brief of Amici Curiae Honorable John Kline, Chairman, Committee of
Education & the Workforce, United States House of Representatives, et al. in
Support of Plaintiff/Appellees at 30, Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, 721 F.3d 152
(4th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-1757) (providing a chart delineating the simultaneous
deliberations and committee votes on the RLA and NLRA amendments).
264. See Chamber of Commerce, 721 F.3d at 166 (concluding that Congress’s
exclusion of notice provisions in the NLRA “can fairly be considered deliberate”).
265. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984) (emphasis added) (providing that courts must assess whether Congress
substantively addressed the measure an administrative board is taking under step-one
of the two-step Chevron doctrine analysis).
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requiring all employers to provide notice of contracts that violated
any term of the NLRA.266 James A. Emery, one of the most ardent
objectors to the contract abrogation provision, testified in opposition
to the NLRA in his capacity as general counsel for the National
Association of Manufacturers.267
Emery convinced the House
Committee on Education and Labor to remove the abrogation
provision—a decision that was characterized as a major victory in
tempering the aims of the NLRA’s principal sponsor, Senator Robert
F. Wagner.268 The problem, Emery argued, was that abrogation
frustrated existing agreements that are genuinely “agreeable to the
parties.”269 The committee agreed, acknowledging that the contract
abrogation provision might go beyond the commercial regulatory
authority of Congress as interpreted by the Supreme Court.270
266. S. 2926, 73d Cong. § 304(b) (as introduced in Senate, Feb. 28, 1934)
(providing that “[a]ny term of a contract or agreement of any kind which conflicts with
the provisions of this act, is hereby abrogated, and every employer who is a party to such
contract or agreement shall immediately so notify his employees by appropriate
action” (emphasis added)), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS ACT, supra note 257, at 1, 14.
267. See Hearings on S. 2926 Before the S. Comm. on Educ. & Labor: Part II, 73d Cong.
(1934) [hereinafter Part II NLRA Hearings] (statement of James A. Emery, General
Counsel, National Association of Manufacturers) (appearing before the committee
as a representative of the manufacturing industry in opposition to “the suggestion
that the normal conduct of the employers shall be outlawed”), reprinted in 1
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, supra note 257, at 367,
373–75; J.A. Emery Scores Wagner Labor Bill: Counsel of Manufacturers’ Association Says
Terms Contradict Its Purposes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1934, at 31 (providing Emery’s
commentary and review of the NLRA and the objections of manufacturers to its
substance). Perhaps a less-than-surprising twist to the history of notice provisions
under the NLRA, the National Association of Manufacturers was among the first to
challenge the Board’s notice-posting regulation in the D.C. Circuit. See supra notes
172–75 and accompanying text (recounting the procedural history).
268. See Wagner To Accept Labor Bill Change: Senator at Hearing Agrees To Include Ban
on ‘Coercion From any Source,’ N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1934, at 7 (detailing the clash
between Emery and Senator Wagner and their eventual compromise to ban coercive
actions by any actor in the labor context and the removal of contract abrogation
provisions from the Act); see also Part II NLRA Hearings, supra note 267, at 395
(statement of Sen. Robert F. Wagner) (agreeing to remove section 304(b) of the
draft NLRA).
269. See Part II NLRA Hearings, supra note 267, at 394 (statement of James A.
Emery, General Counsel, National Association of Manufacturers) (arguing that many
existing labor agreements remain amenable between employees and management,
and the NLRA will frustrate this balance with abrogation and required notice of the
contract’s destruction).
270. The Senate report accompanying the amendments to the NLRA that struck
section 304(b) made clear that Congress was concerned regarding the far-reaching
implications of the abrogation provision in light of recent Supreme Court precedent.
See S. REP NO. 73-1184, at 5–6 (1934) (stating that Congress wanted to remove unfair
pressure and not fair discussion in labor negotiations, and the matter of broadly
abrogating labor contracts might cause confusion), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, supra note 257, at 1099, 1104–05. A
noteworthy point, the Senate report made special mention that the prohibitions
removed from the bill “may be better adapted to a specialized field in which for
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At the time Congress deliberated over the NLRA, intense judicial
debate stirred uncertainty regarding the extent the federal
government could regulate commercial activities.271 The Supreme
Court grappled with the breadth and implication of contractual
liberties afforded under the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive
due process doctrine, and the Court ultimately invalidated earlier
legislative efforts to address economic problems causing labor
strife.272 Just three years prior to the ratification of the NLRA, the
Supreme Court struck down the National Industrial Recovery Act
(NIRA) in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States.273 In response
to the Schechter Poultry decision, Congress cautiously deliberated the
NLRA with the aim of avoiding another Supreme Court battle
resulting in the invalidation of labor related legislation.274 Ultimately,
the U.S. Senate removed the abrogation provision from the NLRA
because of the constitutional implications of the provision’s broad
effect of abrogating contracts that violated any term of the Act, and
not for any reason regarding the substance of requiring notice under
the NLRA.275
many years there has been a history of successful labor organization than to
industries generally,” which leaves open the possibility that Congress, or the Board
through its adjudicative or rulemaking authority, can regulate certain contractual
deficiencies with precision. Id.
271. Prior to Congress’s consideration and enactment of the NLRA, the Supreme
Court invalidated legislative power to modify labor contracts pursuant to Lochner v.
New York and its progeny. See 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (concluding that the
negotiations between employee and employer cannot be prohibited or regulated
without violating the Constitution); see also, e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161,
175 (1908) (holding that “the employer and the employee have equality of right, and
any legislation that disturbs that equality is an arbitrary interference with the liberty
of contract which no government can legally justify in a free land”). However, by the
time Congress moved to consider the NLRA the doctrine of fundamental economic
liberty had weakened. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 523 (1934) (overruling
Lochner and Adair and holding that contractual rights are not absolute and therefore
can be subject to regulation on behalf of the public interest).
272. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 549–50
(1935) (striking down the National Industrial Recovery Act’ because of its intrusion
into the contractual bargaining over process of wages and hours).
273. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
274. See 79 CONG. REC. 8,536 (statement of Sen. Monaghan) (1935) (arguing that
the NLRA rests upon a constitutional basis that is not adverse to the Schechter Poultry
decision), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT,
supra note 257, at 3003, 3006; id. at 6,183 (statement of Sen. Robert F. Wagner)
(combatting the “malicious falsehood” that the Act serves to force individuals into
union agreements), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT, supra note 257, at 2282, 2284; id. at 9,668, 9,681–82 (1935)
(statement of Rep. Hollister) (opposing the NLRA and arguing that it seeks to
circumvent the limitations on regulating commerce as expressed in Schechter Poultry),
reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, supra note
257, at 3093, 3107–08.
275. See Part II NLRA Hearings, supra note 267, at 394–95 (providing discussion of
committee members as to perceived illegality of a broad contract abrogation
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Conversely, Congress included an abrogation notice provision in
the RLA which addressed a much narrower subset of concerns. The
RLA provision singularly aimed to prevent railway carriers from
continuing to operate under “yellow dog contracts,” in which the
railway carrier forced all employees to join a union of its choosing.276
The RLA provision invalidated any employment contract requiring
employees to join a specific company union, and required the
carrier to provide notice of such abrogation pursuant to the
statute’s requirement.277
Juxtaposing the RLA and NLRA contract abrogation provisions, it
becomes clear that Congress chose to strike the NLRA provision
because it had a greater effect compared to the narrow and
calculable scope of the RLA abrogation provision.278 This line of
reasoning—retracting a problematic federal law that abrogates labor
contracts and the accompanying notice provisions—does not address
the very different question of NLRB authority to require notices in
other circumstances.279
provision and the unanimous consent to eliminate the requirement from the bill on
grounds that it presented “a more serious question of constitutional law”). It is
evident, based upon the full record that the argument in favor of removing the
abrogation provision rested upon concerns over the Supreme Court’s rigid
limitations on regulation of contracts, as opposed to concerns over providing notice
to workers. See id. at 431–32 (providing Mr. Emery’s written legal analysis regarding
the NLRA and citing recent precedent affirming the doctrine of contractual liberty
to rebut section 304(b) of the proposed legislation).
276. See 45 U.S.C. § 152 (Fifth) (2012) (providing that employers cannot require
prospective employees “to sign any contract or agreement promising to join or not
join a labor organization”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 73-1944, at 2 (1934) (explaining
that section 2 (Fifth) aims to forbid employer manipulation of labor organizations
and by prohibiting employers “from requiring employees to sign ‘yellow-dog
contracts’ requiring them to join company unions”).
277. 45 U.S.C. § 152.
278. Compare Act of June 21, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-442, § 2 (Fifth), 48 Stat. 1185,
1188 (“No carrier, its officers, or agents shall require any person seeking
employment to sign any contract or agreement promising to join or not to join a
labor organization; and if any such contract has been enforced prior to the effective
date of this Act, then such carrier shall notify the employees by an appropriate order
that such contract has been discarded and is no longer binding on them in any
way.”), and H.R. REP. NO. 73-1944, at 2 (prohibiting employers “from requiring
employees to sign “yellow-dog contracts” requiring them to join company unions”),
with S. 2926, 73d Cong. § 304(b) (as introduced in Senate, Feb. 28, 1934) (providing
that “[a]ny term of a contract or agreement of any kind which conflicts with the
provisions of this Act is hereby abrogated, and every employer who is a party to such
contract or agreement shall immediately so notify his employees by appropriate
action” (emphasis added)), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS ACT, supra note 257, at 1, 14.
279. See Part II NLRA Hearings, supra note 267, at 394 (statements of James A.
Emery, General Counsel, National Association of Manufacturers) (arguing that the
inclusion of a provision intended to provide notice to employees of abrogation
pursuant to passage of the NLRA might cause confusion and generate imprudent
ULP filings as a result of perceived wrongdoing by the frustration of the contract’s
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This same line of reasoning also carries over to the second RLA
notice-posting requirement.280 In addition to the contract abrogation
notice-provision, Congress also inserted a separate notice-posting
provision in the 1934 RLA amendments.281 This provision required
railway carriers to post notices informing all railway employees of
their right to bring dispute resolution matters before the National
Mediation Board established under the RLA.282 The legislative
history of the RLA amendments remains virtually silent regarding this
poster, thereby leaving courts and scholars with their best
approximations as to why Congress included an additional posting
provision in the RLA but omitted such a requirement in the NLRA.283
A Supreme Court administrative law decision from the fall 2012
term may serve to clarify the Board’s authority in this situation. In
City of Arlington v. FCC,284 the Court upheld filing deadlines adopted
by the FCC to clarify ambiguous statutory requirements for the timely
processing of wireless facility zoning applications.285 In administering
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the FCC issued a rule to better
define the statute’s requirement that filings be processed “within a
purpose); see also Reply Brief of the National Labor Relations Board at 17–18,
Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, 721 F.3d 152 (4th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-1757),
(advancing the argument that the notice provision struck from section 304(b), and
the rationale underlying its deletion, is incongruent from the purpose and structure
of the notice-posting requirement promulgated by the Board).
280. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (Eighth) (requiring notice of dispute resolution procedures
under the RLA).
281. Id.
282. See id. (“Every carrier shall notify its employees by printed notices in such
form and posted at such times and places as shall be specified by the Mediation
Board that all disputes between the carrier and its employees will be handled in
accordance with the requirements of this chapter, and in such notices there shall be
printed verbatim, in large type, the third, fourth, and fifth paragraphs of this section.
The provisions of said paragraphs are made a part of the contract of employment
between the carrier and each employee, and shall be held binding upon the parties,
regardless of any other express or implied agreements between them.”).
283. See Chamber of Commerce, 721 F.3d at 165 (“[T]he fact that Congress
considered the possibility of a notice requirement indicates at the very least that
Congress was aware of the option of authorizing such action and chose not to.”); see
also Reply Brief, supra note 279, at 11 n.4 (“The complete absence of any mention of
the RLA’s notice provision in that Act’s own legislative history is strong support for the
commonsense conclusion that such notice provisions are not so momentous that any
limit can be inferred from Congressional silence on the matter.”). Some scholars
have argued that the historical context of union strife surrounding the legislation of
the NLRA may have influenced the decision of Congress to omit inserting notice
provisions in the Act—a focus beyond the scope of this Comment. See DeChiara,
supra note 10, at 431 & n.1 (noting the decline of union density and the growing
need for notification of rights in lieu of union activity). See generally Ireland, supra
note 67, at 943–47, 972–74 (providing background on the decline of union density in
America and economic analysis supporting the need for greater dissemination of
union rights information to uninformed workers).
284. 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
285. Id. at 1867, 1875.
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reasonable period of time.”286 The regulation prescribed 90-day and
150-day
processing
periods
for
various
circumstances.287
Municipalities challenged the FCC’s ability to make such a ruling,
and argued that the FCC lacked authority to make such an
interpretation.288 The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that a
general conferral of rulemaking authority was sufficient to support
deference “for an exercise of that authority within [an] agency’s
substantive field.”289
The frameworks of Beck and AHA support the application of City of
Arlington to the issue of deleted, imprecise, and irrelevant noticeposting requirements in the NLRA’s legislative history.290 Indeed,
Congress did not exercise the option to require notice when it
entrusted the enforcement and interpretation of the NLRA to the
Board.291 As the administrative agency tasked with interpreting and
applying the NLRA to the labor field, the Board is responsible for
“adapt[ing] the Act to changing patterns of industrial life.”292 A
notice requirement necessarily adapts the Act to the decline in public
awareness of labor rights—a matter necessary for the full
implementation and utility of the NLRA in the workplace. Congress,
in 1934, never spoke directly to the issue of Beck notices,293 specified
hospital bargaining unit classifications,294 or the need for notice to all

286. Id. at 1867.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 1874; see also id. at 1871 (“[I]t becomes clear that the question in every
case is, simply, whether the statutory text forecloses the agency’s assertion of
authority, or not.”).
290. See supra Part II.A.2 (providing a generalized framework of Board rulemaking
and notice requirement precedent that supports its authority to require broader
notice provisions).
291. See Notification of Employee Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act,
76 Fed. Reg. 54,006, 54,006–07 (Aug. 30, 2011) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 104)
(“The Board is almost unique among agencies and departments administering major
Federal labor and employment laws in not requiring employers routinely to post
notices at their workplaces informing employees of their statutory rights.”).
292. See NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266 (1975). The J. Weingarten,
Inc. decision did not address a matter of rulemaking but rather a matter of statutory
interpretation through adjudication. Id. at 252. However, the obligation to adapt
the Act to the issues and constraints surrounding labor is not limited to the matter of
adjudication. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. NLRB., 499 U.S. 606, 612 (1991) (affirming the
Board’s authority to prescribe rules to help clarify labor related issues).
293. See Cal. Saw & Knife Works, 320 N.L.R.B. 224, 252 (1995) (requiring unions
to provide notice of Beck rights despite the absence of an express congressional
mandate directly addressing this matter).
294. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 499 U.S. at 612 (upholding the Board’s prescribed health
care bargaining unit classifications despite the absence of an express congressional
mandate directly addressing this matter).
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employees of their rights under the Act.295 The subsequent and
concurrent enactment of notice-posting requirements in other
contexts neither contradicts nor is inconsistent with Congress’s grant
of broad NLRB rulemaking authority to encourage and protect the
labor rights of American workers.296
c.

Negating congressional admonition: An example of employment
notice requirements promulgated through rulemaking

Since 1934, Congress has amended the NLRA three times, and on
each occasion has left the issue of notice-posting requirements
unaddressed.297 During intervening sessions, Congress also enacted
various employment provisions that require agencies to promulgate
notice-posting requirements.298
Courts have measured these
congressionally enacted notice provisions against the NLRB’s
regulation, concluding that “Congress’s continued exclusion of a
notice-posting requirement from the NLRA, concomitant with its
granting of such authority to other agencies, can fairly be considered
deliberate.”299 Although the optics of notice posters in other contexts
appear unsupportive of congressional will to require notices under
the NLRA, the presence of other posting requirements do not
address the entirely separate issue of the Board’s authority to
promulgate a regulation of its own.300
A notice poster promulgated by the Department of Labor’s Wage
and Hour Division (WHD) serves as a comparable example and
demonstrates that, despite congressional silence, agencies may
promulgate a notice-posting regulation through rulemaking.301 In
1949 and in 1987, the WHD promulgated notice-posting

295. See 76 Fed. Reg. at 54,006 (promulgating a regulation proscribing notice
posters under the NLRA despite the absence of express congressional mandate
addressing this matter).
296. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012) (providing the Board’s mission to eliminate
practices that obstruct the exercise of labor rights); id. § 156 (providing the Board
with rulemaking authority to aid in furthering the other sections of the Act).
297. See generally Labor Management Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat.
136 (1947) (containing no provisions requiring generalized notice posters); see also
Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395 (same); Labor Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (same).
298. See Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, 856 F. Supp. 2d 778, 784 n.4 (D.S.C.
2012) (providing a timeline of employment related legislation requiring notice
postings), aff’d, 721 F.3d 152 (4th Cir. 2013).
299. Chamber of Commerce, 721 F.3d at 166.
300. See supra notes 28–50 and accompanying text (addressing NLRB authority to
promulgate regulations under its statute as well as Supreme Court precedent
supporting the Board’s authority to promulgate substantive rules).
301. See 29 C.F.R. § 516.4 (promulgated by the Department of Labor Wage and
Hour Division).
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requirements pursuant to a grant of rulemaking authority under the
Fair Labor Standards Act302 (FLSA). WHD based its power to compel
notice-postings on its authority to prescribe rules “necessary or
appropriate” to ensure that employers “make, keep, and preserve
such records of . . . wages, hours, and other conditions and practices
of employment.”303 The posting requirement promulgated from this
authority compelled employers to post a notice informing workers of
their rights and wage rates under the FLSA.304
The legislative history establishing the WHD and its rulemaking
authority does not address the matter of notice-posting
requirements.305 The language conferring rulemaking authority
upon the WHD to carry out the FLSA is nearly identical to the
authority granted to the NLRB.306 Though the WHD notice-posting
rule has not been legally challenged, its nearly sixty-five year
existence serves as an example of notice-posting requirements
originating beyond the halls of Congress.
B. The Right To Disagree Is Not Infringed: Compulsory Notice-Posting
Requirements and Speech Protections Under the NLRA
Notice-posting requirements educate workers, unions, and
employers of the legal rights that apply to job-related interactions.307
Requiring legal disclosure is not uncommon; there are a myriad of
302. See Records To Be Kept by Employers: Posting of Notices, 14 Fed. Reg. 7,516
(Dec. 16, 1949) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 516.18 (1950)) (determining that the
“posting of notices of the applicability of the act . . . is a necessary adjunct to proper
enforcement of the statutory provisions, and is an essential aid to the Division in
preventing evasion or circumvention of the statutory provisions, and that a general
requirement for posting of such notices in all covered establishments should be
adopted”); see also Fair Labor Standards Act: Records To Be Kept by Employers, 52
Fed. Reg. 24,894, 24,898 (Jul. 1, 1987) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 516 (1988)) (“Every
employer employing any employees subject to the Act’s minimum wage provisions
shall post and keep posted a notice explaining the Act, as prescribed by the Wage
and Hour Division, in conspicuous places in every establishment where such
employees are employed so as to permit them to observe readily a copy.”).
303. 29 U.S.C. § 211(c).
304. See DEP’T OF LABOR, EMPLOYEE RIGHTS UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
(2009), available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/posters/minwage.pdf
(last visited Jan. 16, 2014).
305. S. REP. NO. 99-159, at 7 (1985) (noting that the WHD will be the arm of the
Department of Labor tasked with investigating FLSA violations, but providing no
mention or discussion of notice-posting requirements).
306. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 211(c) (providing that the WHD “shall prescribe by
regulation or order as necessary or appropriate for the enforcement of the provisions
of this chapter”), with id. § 156 (“The Board shall have authority from time to time to
make, amend, and rescind . . . such rules and regulations as may be necessary to
carry out the provisions of this subchapter.”).
307. See Morris, supra note 71, at 112 (“[E]mployees must know what their rights
are and have a realistic expectation that the Board can protect them in the exercise
of those rights.”).
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statutes and regulations requiring notice and disclosure of
substantive rights,308 safety risks,309 and matters of health310 in the law.
A notice-posting requirement under the NLRA serves the same
justifications—aiming to educate workers of the rights and
protections afforded to them under the Act.311
Chief among the workplace rights afforded under the NLRA are
protections of non-coercive viewpoints expressed about union
activity.312 Explicit in this statutory protection is the right of
employers, unions, and laborers to express differing views in a forum
of free-flowing ideas.313 Implicit in this statutory protection is the
implementation of First Amendment rights.314
Opponents of the NLRB’s notice-posting regulation successfully
argued that the rule violated their rights under section 8(c) of the
NLRA.315 This assertion echoed the losing arguments of unions in
litigation opposing Beck notice-posting requirements during the
George W. Bush administration.316 The distinctions that triggered
this differing result stem from the NLRB’s treatment of a failure to
post as “evidence of an antiunion animus.”317 requiring The D.C.
Circuit concluded that section 8(c) protects an employer’s right to
disagree with, or non-coercively omit, any positions supporting

308. See 15 U.S.C. § 1632(a) (requiring disclosure of percentage rates and charges
for the purposes of consumer education and protection in transactions).
309. See id. § 1278(a) (mandating warning labels on toys or games for children
who are at least three years of age that the product may contain products that could
choke a young child).
310. See id. § 1333(a) (requiring warning labels disclosing addictive and negative
health effects on smoking and tobacco products).
311. See Notification of Employee Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act,
76 Fed. Reg. 54,006, 54,006 (Aug. 30, 2011) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 104) (“For
employees to fully exercise their NLRA rights, however, they must know that those
rights exist and that the Board protects those rights.”).
312. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (providing protections for non-coercive speech).
313. Id.
314. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. (prohibiting Congress from enacting laws that
abridge the freedom of speech); NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617
(1969) (discussing section 8(c)’s implementation of First Amendment protections by
providing that differing views and opinions on labor cannot be construed as a ULP).
315. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 717 F.3d 947, 959 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
(concluding that NLRB’s treatment of a willful failure to post as anti-union activity
violates the NLRA and the First Amendment).
316. See UAW-Labor Emp’t & Training Corp. v. Chao, 325 F.3d 360, 365 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (rejecting arguments that Beck notice-posting requirements violate a union’s
section 8(c) right to refrain from stating a message to which it disagrees).
317. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 717 F.3d at 955, 958 (discussing the statutes treatment
of non-compliance with the law); id. at 959 (analyzing the Board’s treatment of a
failure to post as a ULP and concluding that failing to post is a protected “right of
employers (and unions) not to speak”). But see UAW-Labor Emp’t & Training Corp.,
325 F.3d at 369 (recognizing the implementation of section 7 and section 8 rights is
“a matter left to the Board”).
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unionization.318 Accordingly, the Board’s classification of willful
noncompliance as evidence of an anti-union animus violates the
intent of Congress when it amended the NLRA to include section
8(c).319 This finding, however, does not preclude the Board from
requiring employers to post notices under the Act320—it merely
supplants the Board’s prescribed enforcement measures.321
Two key distinctions support the Board’s ability to require noticepostings without the enforcement mechanisms it originally
prescribed. First, the Board’s poster propagates the government’s
message, providing the public with the Board’s interpretations and
expressions of law. Second, employers enjoy the right to disavow any
nexus with, or endorsement of, the poster’s content.
1.

The notice poster propagates a government message
The doctrine of government speech provides that the
government must be able to communicate its own message in
order to properly function.322 As an interpreter of the NLRA, the
Board also contributes to workplace discourse as a governmental
voice seeking to provide more certainty and exactness in the law. 323
Accordingly, the NLRB issues regulations and adjudicatory

318. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 717 F.3d at 959 (“We therefore conclude that the
Board’s rule violates § 8(c) because it makes an employer’s failure to post the
Board’s notice an unfair labor practice, and because it treats such a failure as
evidence of anti-union animus . . . .”.).
319. See S. REP. NO. 80-105, at 23–24 (1947) (“Section 8(c) . . . would insure both
to employers and labor organizations full freedom to express their views to
employees on labor matters, refrain from threats of violence, intimation of economic
reprisal or offers of benefit . . . . [I]f, under all the circumstances, there is neither an
expressed or implied threat of reprisal, force, or offer of benefit, the Board shall not
predicate any finding of unfair labor practice upon the statement. The Board, of
course, will not be precluded from considering such statements as evidence.”).
320. See Cal. Saw & Knife Works, 320 N.L.R.B. 224, 233 (1995) (affirming that a
“notice requirement furnishes significant protection to the interests of the
individual” under the NLRA).
321. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 846 F. Supp. 2d 34, 63 (D.D.C. 2012) (“In
sum, the Board lawfully promulgated Subpart A of its Final Rule, which requires
employers to post a notice of employee rights, but exceeded the authority granted to
it by Congress under the NLRA by promulgating the two provisions under Subpart B
that permit the Board to deem failure to post an unfair labor practice and to toll the
statute of limitations for claims brought by employees against employers who failed
to post the notice.”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 717 F.3d 947 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
322. The Supreme Court, 2008 Term—Leading Cases, 123 HARV. L. REV. 232, 238
(2009) (“[I]n order to function, [the] government must have the ability to express
certain points of view, and it would be unable to do so effectively if, for example, the
Constitution required a government pro-democracy campaign to be accompanied by
a pro-fascism campaign.”).
323. S. REP. NO. 74-573, at 4, 8 (1935).

AMODEO.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

4/2/2014 2:24 PM

FAIR NOTICE

839

opinions to provide the public with knowledge of its
understanding and application of the NLRA.324
Congress included section 8(c) in the NLRA to promote and
protect the free flow of ideas between employees, unions, and
employers.325 The legislative history of section 8(c) evidences intent
“to prevent the Board from attributing anti-union motive to an
employer on the basis of [the employer’s] past statements.”326 In
essence, Congress wanted to restrict the Board from reading heavily
into prior speeches and publications of employers.327 This limitation,
however, does not preclude the government from contributing to the
forum of labor discussion—particularly in connection with
restatement and disclosure of the law.328
The Board’s notice poster acts in accordance with section 8(c) and
propagates the Board’s interpretation of the Act, while also providing
readers with identification of its authorship.329 The poster contains
the clear and conspicuous statement that “[t]his is an official
Government Notice and must not be defaced by anyone.”330 The
poster also bears the insignia of the Board, informing readers that
the contents of the poster are attributable to a governmental agency
and not a union, employee, or employer.331 Accordingly, the NLRB’s
poster seeks to propagate a government message that is not
attributable to any employer, union, or employee.332
2.

The right to disagree is not infringed: Employer speech protections
Tantamount to an employer’s right to refrain from speaking is the
right to openly disagree.333 The Supreme Court has provided a
syllogism which controls matters of government speech: where a
324. See supra notes 24–49 and accompanying text.
325. See Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of Am., Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 62
(1966) (recounting that section 8(c) evidences “congressional intent to encourage
free debate on issues dividing labor and management”).
326. Id. at 62 n.5.
327. See H.R. REP. NO. 80-510, at 45 (1947) (providing Congress’s justification for
amending the Act to provide protection for non-coercive speech).
328. See NLRB, BASIC GUIDE TO THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT: GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF LAW UNDER THE STATUTE AND PROCEDURES OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD 1 (1997 ed.), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/documents/224
/basicguide.pdf (providing the view of the Board’s Office of General Counsel on the
basic functions and framework of the NLRA to members of the public).
329. See Employee Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act, supra note 5
(providing a copy of the poster that contains the NLRB’s insignia prominently
displayed on the upper left hand corner).
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980) (holding that
a private party may disavow a compelled message by posting its own message).
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private individual is directly impacted by a governmental message,
and if that individual is unable to disavow itself of the government’s
message, the government’s action is invalid.334 Opponents of the
NLRB’s notice-posting regulation contended that an employer’s
unwillingness to display a notice poster amounts to an expression that
is protected under the NLRA.335 Any requirement adverse to that
right, they argued, violates speech protections.336
Courts have previously explored this issue in other employmentposting contexts.337 In Lake Butler Apparel Co. v. Secretary of Labor,338
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit examined an
employer’s challenge to a compulsory notice poster informing
employees of their rights under the Occupational Safety and Health
Act339 (OSHA). Remarkably, the D.C. Circuit omitted any mention of
the Lake Butler opinion in its review of the NLRB’s notice-posting
regulation.340 The omission of this authority on notice-postings is
334. Compare Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (holding that New
Hampshire’s requirement for all motorists to display the motto “live free or die” was
unconstitutional), and W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)
(holding that a school policy forcing students to salute the U.S. flag as
unconstitutional), with Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 481 (2009)
(holding that the government is not subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech
Clause), Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 62
(2006) (holding that a government mandated accommodation of military recruiters
at law schools is constitutional because the school can disavow itself of any
endorsement of the military), Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 562
(2005) (holding that a message strictly controlled by the government and paid for by
assessed taxes does not violate the First Amendment), and PruneYard Shopping Ctr.,
447 U.S. at 87 (holding that a private party may disavow a compelled message by
posting its own message expressing such disagreement).
335. See Notification of Employee Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act,
76 Fed. Reg. 54,006, 54,012 (Aug. 30, 2011) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 104)
(recounting objections by opponents to the regulation who characterize the poster
as conveying “pro-union NLRA rights”).
336. Id.
337. See Lake Butler Apparel Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 519 F.2d 84, 89 (5th Cir. 1975)
(holding that the posting of an OSHA notice does not reflect the expression of the
employer and the compulsory mandate to display the document does not amount to
employer speech).
338. 519 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975).
339. Id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1903.2 (requiring that employers subject to OSHA post
notice informing employees of their rights and remedies under the law).
340. The D.C. Circuit did address its conclusory statements from the UAW-Labor
Employment & Training Corp. decision where it previously cited Lake Butler. See Nat’l
Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 717 F.3d 947, 958 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (citing UAW-Labor Emp’t
& Training Corp. v. Chao, 325 F.3d 360, 365 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). However, the
substance of the D.C. Circuit opinion offers a scant rebuttal to the Lake Butler
decision. Compare Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 717 F.3d at 959 (addressing the UAW decision
to clarify that the court was “making a different point: that apart from the § 8(c) bar
against unfair-labor-practice charges, the National Labor Relations Act did not give
employers an unconstrained right to silence”), with Lake Butler, 519 F.2d at 89 (“The
posting of the notice does not by any stretch of the imagination reflect one way or
the other on the views of the employer. It merely states what the law requires. The
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incongruous with the D.C. Circuit’s prior review of Beck notices
during the George H. W. Bush administration, where the D.C. Circuit
expressly relied upon Lake Butler to support its holding.341
In Lake Butler, an OSHA inspector found a clothing manufacturing
plant in violation of various OSHA standards, including failure to
display a notice poster, during a routine compliance inspection.342 In
response to these violations, the manufacturer filed for administrative
review and reconsideration with the OSHA Review Commission.343
The Commission upheld the violations and the manufacturer
appealed to the Fifth Circuit, arguing that a compulsory notice poster
violates free speech protections.344 Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit
concluded that a notice-posting requirement “merely states what the
law requires” and does not reflect the employer’s views.345 Supreme
Court precedent supports the findings in Lake Butler that employers
and citizens have a right to disagree with, but not obstruct,
government expressions.346
The Supreme Court has been careful to distinguish matters where
a speaker cannot refute a compulsory and disagreeable message,
noting that the opportunity for a private citizen to openly disagree
with the message eliminates First Amendment problems.347 A First
Amendment decision from the Court’s fall 2012 term, issued after the
D.C. Circuit’s opinion, offers a ripe example further supporting this
important distinction.348 In Agency for International Development v.

employer may differ with the wisdom of the law and this requirement even to the
point as done here, of challenging its validity . . . . But the First Amendment which
gives him the full right to contest validity to the bitter end cannot justify his refusal to
post a notice . . . .” (emphasis added)).
341. See UAW-Labor Emp’t & Training Corp., 325 F.3d at 365 (arguing that an
employer’s right to silence is limited in the labor context because, legally and
constitutionally, an employer bears a burden to provide notice to workers of risks
and rights in the workplace) (citing Lake Butler, 519 F.2d at 89)).
342. Lake Butler, 519 F.2d at 85.
343. Id. at 85–86.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 89.
346. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47,
63 (2006) (noting that compelled speech is imputed where the compelled speaker’s
message is affected by the government’s viewpoint).
347. See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 87–88 (1980) (holding
that a private party may disagree with publicly displayed notices of pamphlets,
rendering their free speech rights protected within the forum) (citing Wooley v.
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977); Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S.
241, 256–58 (1974); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633
(1943))).
348. See Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321,
2332 (2013) (confirming that requiring grant recipients to adopt the government’s
anti-prostitution policy as a condition of funding violates the First Amendment).
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Alliance for Open Society International, Inc.,349 the Supreme Court
examined a conditional spending clause that required federally
funded international nonprofit organizations to have a policy openly
denouncing prostitution.350 If the government found an organization
in violation of this requirement, it would lose funding.351 Several
nonprofits moved to invalidate this requirement and argued that the
compelled message stifled the neutral viewpoint of organizations
seeking to provide aid to the sex worker demographic.352 Chief
Justice Roberts, writing for the six-three majority, invalidated the
conditional spending requirement because it did not allow room for
a grant recipient to disavow itself of the government’s message.353
The AID decision translates easily to the Board’s notice-posting
requirement because it highlights the significance of an entity’s
ability to disavow itself of any endorsement of government speech.354
In other contexts, the Court has held that a compulsory message
does not impinge on the rights of an entity or individual where one is
able to openly disagree.355 In Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and
Institutional Rights Inc.,356 the Court upheld a program requiring law
schools to allow military recruiters on campus—despite a school’s
express disagreement with the military.357
In support of this
349. 133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013).
350. Id. at 2326.
351. 22 U.S.C. § 7631(f) (2012) (“No funds made available to carry out this
chapter, or any amendment made by this chapter, may be used to provide assistance
to any group or organization that does not have a policy explicitly opposing
prostitution and sex trafficking . . .”).
352. Agency for Int’l Dev., 133 S. Ct. at 2326 (“Respondents fear that adopting a
policy explicitly opposing prostitution may alienate certain host governments, and
may diminish the effectiveness of some of their programs by making it more difficult
to work with prostitutes in the fight against HIV/AIDS.”).
353. See id. at 2330–31 (invalidating government requirements that private entities
adopt the government’s anti-prostitution policy or lose funding).
354. Id. at 2330 (invalidating the government’s aim of compelling fund
recipients to “adopt a similar stance” to its policy aims, and the damaging inability
for groups to disavow the government’s message (internal citations omitted)). The
Court’s analysis highlights the countervailing and pressurized dynamic between
government speech and private speech protections.
Ultimately, both the
government and private speakers retain the right of expression in the global
forum. Compare id. at 2332 (invalidating the conditional spending clause because it
requires recipients to “pledge allegiance” to the government’s message), with id. at
2332 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The First Amendment does not mandate a viewpointneutral government.”).
355. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47,
62 (2003) (“[I]t has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or
press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part
initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or
printed.” (internal citations and quotations omitted)).
356. 547 U.S. 47 (2003).
357. Id. at 70; see also id. at 69–70 (holding that schools are free to openly disagree
with the required presence of military recruiters on campus, and therefore a school
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proposition, the Court borrowed a hypothetical example from the
employment context: “Congress, for example, can prohibit employers
from discriminating in hiring on the basis of race. The fact that this
will require an employer to take down a sign reading ‘White Applicants
Only’ hardly means that the law should be analyzed as one regulating
the employer’s speech rather than conduct.”358 In essence, regulation
of certain conduct in compliance with a statutory obligation does not
necessarily amount to compulsory speech.359
The same justifications apply to the concept of notice-posting
requirements under the NLRA, particularly when examined through
the lens of Beck and the Board’s subsequent interpretations of Becknotice requirements.360 The Board may require unions to provide
notice to nonmembers of their rights under section 8(a) to object to
certain expenditures—a measure which substantively functions to
regulate nonmember and union conduct.361 The fact that a union is
required to provide a statement of expenditures to a nonmember
“hardly means that the law should be analyzed as one regulating the
employer’s speech rather than conduct.”362 A notice poster requiring
employers to provide broader information regarding the rights
afforded under the NLRA furthers these same interests, and places all
parties on notice of the laws governing their interactions.363 An
employer is free to openly disagree with the law, but that
disagreement does not absolve the employer of its responsibility to
post notices informing employees of their rights.364

does not expressly or implicitly adopt a pro-military message because of the right to
freely disassociate).
358. Id. at 62.
359. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 198 (1991) (holding that employees are
free to pursue activities in contrast to government speech); id. at 200 (providing that
an individual subject to government speech is permitted to make clear that more
information exists beyond the scope of the government’s message).
360. See UAW-Labor Emp’t & Training Corp. v. Chao, 325 F.3d 360, 365 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (upholding a Beck notice requirement and noting the constraints placed upon
employer speech in the employment context to post various notices).
361. See Cal. Saw & Knife Works, 320 N.L.R.B. 224, 231–37 (1995) (outlining the
requirement for notice and the justifications for providing such notice of Beck rights).
362. Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 62.
363. See Notification of Employee Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act,
76 Fed. Reg. 54,006, 54,006–07 (August 30, 2011) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt.
104) (providing the Board’s justification that employees are unaware of their rights
and therefore lack notice of their legal protections under the Act).
364. Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 62 (providing an example from the employment context
which illustrates that laws regulating employer conduct do not necessarily regulate
speech, and therefore do not abridge the employers message but rather an
underlying action).
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CONCLUSION

In enacting the NLRA, Congress sought to erect a governmental
agency that would promote and enforce peaceful settlements of labor
disputes.365 To successfully facilitate this policy aim, it is essential that
all actors in the workplace possess the requisite knowledge of their
legal rights.366 Though Congress declined to insert a notice-posting
provision within the NLRA, the absence of such language does not
preclude the Board from promulgating its own notice requirements
through its rulemaking authority.367 The presence of legal advisory
notices in the workplace is a form of government-mandated
disclosure and informs private citizens of their legal rights through a
government message.368 Although there are many arguments in
opposition to the contents and message of the Board’s notice-posting
provision, those disagreeing viewpoints possess the power to
persuasively voice their opposition to the same audiences—perhaps
with even greater effect.
The Board was correct in exercising its authority to notify workers
of their substantive rights under the NLRA. It is emphatically the
prerogative of the Board to protect, encourage, and expound upon
the rights promised to labor workers under the Act. As this piece
went to print, the NLRB announced that it would not petition the
Supreme Court for review of its notice-posting regulation.369 Should
the NLRB seek to proactively regulate employers in the future, the
effect of the D.C. and Fourth Circuits rulings should be revisited to
clarify the NLRB’s broad rulemaking authority. Regardless of
political leanings, it remains a great travesty whenever citizens are
unaware of their substantive rights. More must be done to educate
the public, and the NLRB retains the power to pursue such a mission.

365. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012) (declaring that government policy is to encourage
collective bargaining between employers and employees).
366. See 76 Fed. Reg. at 54,006 (proclaiming that employees need to know their
rights in order to exercise them).
367. See supra notes 209–26 and accompanying text.
368. See supra notes 51–58 and accompanying text.
369. The NLRB’s Notice Posting Rule, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD (Jan. 6, 2014), http://www
.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/nlrbs-notice-posting-rule.

